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Default is among the most disruptive events in the life of a corporation. It is imperative 
for a firm to avoid default because it brings bankruptcy-filing, legal, and professional costs. It 
interrupts the supply chain and causes disruptions in productivity (Brogaard et al., 2015). In a 
case of default, customers may become reluctant to buy products from the defaulted firm; 
suppliers may tighten credit terms; some current employees may become demotivated due to 
fear of job insecurity; others may seek employment elsewhere. In addition, default brings 
mental stress to the proprietor, the entrepreneur, the managers, and their families; it may even 
destroy lives, ruin the health of its victims and, in a worst-case scenario, push victims to 
commit suicide (Argenti, 1976). Given these severe consequences of default, it is imperative 
to explore what determines default risk. In particular, we aim to answer: Does corporate 
governance affect default risk?  
Corporate governance has attracted considerable public attention in recent years around 
the globe. It has emerged as a hot topic of discussion among researchers and regulators as a 
result of a number of high profile corporate scandals. For instance, in 2001 the bankruptcy of 
HIH Insurance—a major provider of all types of insurance in Australia—was attributed to 
problematic internal governance such as the improper functioning of the board and the lack of 
independence of the internal audit committee and the external auditors (Owen, 2003). 
Similarly, media reports, as well as Australian Government ministers, blamed inefficient 
management for being the prime reason for the failure of Ansett Australia—Australia’s 
second-largest airline carrier—in 2002 (see Leiper, 2002). Furthermore, in 2001 the 
bankruptcy of OneTel—once Australia’s fourth-largest telecommunication firm, with over 2 
million customers and operations in eight countries—is associated with deficiencies in its 
internal governance, including weaknesses in internal structures and processes, audit quality, 
and the board’s scrutiny of management (see Monem, 2011). These corporate collapses have 
resulted in the loss of thousands of jobs and have shattered multi billions of dollars in 
shareholder wealth.1 Since these corporate scandals were attributed to problematic internal 
governance mechanisms, considerable debate initiated to overcome weak corporate 
governance practices (Kang et al., 2007) resulted in various legislative reforms. In particular, 
ASX CG Council and related bodies became more vigilant about the risk prevailing in a 
firm’s balance sheet and developed the new governance framework “Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations” in 2003 to deter managers from 
wealth expropriation and thus restore the confidence of investors (Clarke and Dean, 2007). 
These governance recommendations focus mainly on controlling risk through monitoring 
aspects of corporate governance, such as the independence of a board and its subcommittees 
because board of directors is the ‘apex body’ of a firm’s internal governance system (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983), and is considered to be the ‘first-line of defence’ (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1988) for the shareholders against incumbent management. In this study, we 
                                                 
1 For instance, the bankruptcy of HIH insurance caused an enormous loss to both individuals and the community 
at large, with the total deficit estimated to be between $3.6 billion and $5.3 billion (Owen, 2003). The 
bankruptcy of Ansett Australia resulted in the direct job loss of almost 16,000 people and the indirect job loss of 














therefore investigate the role of corporate governance (board structure) as a critical 
determinant of the default risk. 
Studies examining the relationship of corporate governance with ex-post-bankruptcy and 
ex-post financial distress are aplenty (see e.g., Miglani et al., 2010; Platt and Platt, 2012). 
Although these studies find a significant role for various governance mechanisms in 
prediction of bankruptcy and financial distress; but these studies are conducted in an ‘ex-
post’ setting, which is subject to criticism in terms of non-random sampling design because it 
imposes substantial limitations on the sample available for investigation (see Balcaen and 
Ooghe, 2006).2 Relatively little effort has been made to empirically investigate the role of 
corporate governance in the ex-ante default risk (e.g., Chiang et al., 2015; Schultz et al., 
2015). Overall, these studies consider individual governance mechanisms (instead of a 
composite governance index), thus miss out effects from overall governance quality (Henry, 
2008).3 Notably, the individual governance mechanisms vary from one study to another and 
sometimes produce contradictory results, making it difficult for investors to decide which 
governance mechanisms should be considered in developing their investment strategy.4 Our 
study extends this literature by examining the effect of composite governance quality on 
default risk. 
Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, only two studies investigate the role of 
individual governance mechanisms in the default risk for Australian firms and find mixed 
results. One study finds that certain governance mechanisms reduce ex-post financial distress 
(Miglani et al., 2015) whereas the other study finds that corporate governance does not matter 
for ex-ante default risk (Schultz et al., 2015). However, both these studies find the irrelevance 
of board structure with default risk (see section 2 for details). Given these inconclusive 
findings, which may be caused by using individual governance mechanisms and 
methodological shortcomings such as small sample size and sample period in the literature, 
our study is timely and sheds new light on the ongoing literature debate: Does corporate 
governance (board structure) really affect default risk? 
Theoretically, poor corporate governance increases information asymmetries between 
management and shareholders and maximizes the moral hazard problem where managers can 
pursue their self-interests (e.g., shirking responsibility and overcompensation), and transfer 
the wealth of a firm to themselves at the expense of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). The moral hazard problem increases the agency risk to the shareholders. The increased 
                                                 
2 Particularly if sampling is done on one-to-one matching criteria, leading to estimation sample which is less 
representative of the whole population. 
3 Henry (2008) finds no support of individual governance mechanisms in explaining firm value for Australian 
firms. However, when the individual governance mechanisms are combined together in an index form, there is a 
significant relationship between the governance score and firm value. He argues that these findings are 
supportive of the development of a comprehensive code of governance practice, as opposed to the adoption of 
individual governance practices. 
4 For instance, Miglani et al. (2015) used percentage of independent directors, CEO duality, existence of audit 
committee, audit opinion, percentage of shares held by directors and block holders. However, Chiang et al, 
(2015) used board size, board compensation, managerial ownership, director ownership, institutional ownership, 














agency risk decreases the expected value of the future cash flow and increases the volatility 
of the future cash flow, thus increasing the risk of default in a firm (Ashbaugh-Skaifea et al., 
2006). Given these arguments, we hypothesize that poor (better) governed firms should have 
a lower (higher) level of default risk. 
In addition, we explore the two extensions beyond the baseline idea. First, we examine if 
the governance–default linkage is moderated by degrees of growth opportunities. 
Specifically, we argue that the effect of corporate governance on default risk may not be 
uniform across high and low growth firms and that the ‘one size fits all’ governance practices 
might be unsuitable. Presumably, information asymmetry is higher for high growth firms 
since managers are likely to receive private information about the value of future projects that 
is not readily observable by shareholders. Therefore, high growth firms are associated with 
higher shareholder/manager agency costs, and are in great need of governance controls 
(Hutchinson and Gul, 2004). Moreover, Lyandres and Zhdanov (2013) claim that the optimal 
default strategy of a firm depends on its mix of growth options and assets in place and find 
that shareholders would be willing to wait longer before default their contractual obligation 
for firms with valuable investment opportunities than those without such opportunities. Given 
these evidences, we hypothesize that the inverse relation between corporate governance and 
default risk should be relatively stronger (in magnitude) for firms with more growth 
opportunities.  
Second, we examine if information asymmetry (measured through stock liquidity) plays 
the role as a channel between corporate governance and default risk. Better corporate 
governance mitigates information asymmetry between insiders (e.g., managers) and outsiders 
(e.g., investors), as well as among outsiders, by improving the informational transparency of 
a firm (Chung et al., 2010; Prommin et al., 2014). As a result, traders face less adverse 
selection problems (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) and are willing to provide more liquidity to 
stocks of well governed firms. Furthermore, Brogaard et al. (2015) find that default risk 
decreases with an increase in stock liquidity for the quote-driven US firms. Given these two 
strands of literature, we posit that corporate governance improves stock liquidity (reduces 
information asymmetry), and improved stock liquidity in turns reduces default risk.  
To test these hypotheses, we take advantage of recently available governance data of 
Australian firms through the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) 
database. We use a large sample of 1,086 non-financial Australian firms (8,950 firm-year 
observations) over the period from 2001 to 2013, and measure composite corporate 
governance by following the Horwath report. To measure default risk, we employ two 
market-based proxies: the Merton (1974) distance to default (DD) and the credit default swap 
spread (CDS). We measure growth opportunities through the market to book ratio. Finally, 
we use three proxies of stock liquidity: the time-weighted quoted spread (TWQS), the 
Amihud illiquidity estimate (AMIHUD), and the turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM). 















We have three main results. First, we find that aggregate governance quality is 
negatively and significantly related to ex-ante default risk. The association survives even 
after controlling for the firm or industry effect, for a year effect, and for firm characteristics 
such as profitability, leverage, liquidity, firm size, growth opportunities, and firm age. Via a 
series of robust checks, we confirm that the findings are insensitive to alternative estimation 
methods, to endogeneity bias, to alternative proxies of default risk, to individual governance 
categories, and to additional control variables. From a wider regulatory perspective, our 
index-based findings are supportive of the development of a comprehensive code of 
governance practice, as opposed to the adoption of individual governance practices and able 
to provide a guideline for investors to use composite governance as a benchmark in the 
selection of stocks that are less likely to face default.  
Second, our findings appear to support the hypothesis that the benefit of corporate 
governance seems to confine to high growth firms only. These findings are robust to 
alternative proxies for growth opportunities and governance categories. This heterogeneity in 
the governance–default nexus provides empirical support to the ‘comply or explain’ 
governance regime in Australia and suggests that, while designing their corporate governance 
structure, firms should consider their growth conditions. Our third main result shows the 
inverse effect of stock liquidity on default risk in a pure order-driven Australian market, and 
that the interaction effect of corporate governance and stock liquidity on default risk is 
stronger than the stand-alone partial effect of corporate governance, suggesting that 
information asymmetry is a channel between corporate governance and default risk. These 
findings are robust to alternative proxies for stock liquidity, governance categories, and 
alternative estimation methods. The implication of these findings is that firms with low stock 
liquidity should strive for high governance standards if they are to avoid future defaults. 
The main contributions of our study to the literature are threefold. First, we contribute to 
the literature on corporate governance and default risk (e.g., Chiang et al., 2015; Schultz et 
al., 2015). As far as could be ascertained, this is the first study to show that composite 
internal corporate governance is relevant to default risk in the Australian context, even when 
a potential endogeneity bias is considered. Second, we contribute to the growing governance 
literature that argues ‘one size does not fit all’ (e.g., Coles et al., 2008) by providing a new 
insight that the relationship between corporate governance and default risk depends on 
growth opportunities. Third, while documenting that corporate governance interacts with 
information asymmetry to reduce default risk, we complement the two streams of literature: 
(1) corporate finance (i.e., corporate governance) and market microstructure (i.e., stock 
liquidity) (e.g., Chung et al., 2010), and (2) market microstructure (i.e., stock liquidity) and 
asset pricing (i.e., default risk) (e.g., Brogaard et al., 2015). 
We also contribute to the literature in terms of methodology. First, unlike prior studies on 
corporate governance and default risk in Australia (Miglani et al., 2015; Schultz et al., 2015), 
the sample firms in our study come from all non-financial industries and ages, and are 
heterogeneous in size and profitability. The extended dataset allows us to generalize results to 














prior to the global financial crisis (GFC) i.e., 2008–2009;5 thus, the finding might not be 
directly applicable to the post-GFC (2010 onwards) conditions. Third, we provide additional 
evidence for the usefulness of the Horwath report by linking it to the default risk. Prior 
studies measuring corporate governance through the Horwath report either are cross-sectional 
or have linked it to corporate activities other than default risk, such as information disclosure 
(Beekes et al., 2015), and stock liquidity (Ali et al., 2016). Moreover, given some limitations 
of the Horwath report (see section 4.3 for details); we simplify the Horwath report by 
excluding the subjective criteria and by using an equally weighted scoring methodology, as 
well as, we extend the Horwath report to both cross-sectional (including small and medium 
firms) and time-series (including 2009 to 2013) dimensions. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the reasons for 
selecting Australia as a case study. Section 3 presents the literature review and hypotheses 
development. Section 4 describes the data, variables, estimation models, and econometric 
methods, and provides summary statistics. Section 5 discusses the main empirical results for 
the relationship between corporate governance and default risk. Section 6 discusses the 
results on the role of growth opportunities in the relationship between corporate governance 
and default risk. Section 7 provides the results on stock liquidity and the impact of corporate 
governance on default risk. Section 8 documents the additional analysis of the relationship 
between corporate governance and default risk. Section 9 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Motivation: Why Australia? 
Australia is an interesting case for examining the empirical relationship between 
corporate governance and default risk because of two key factors: the distinctive corporate 
environment, and the contradictory findings in the literature. First, findings from other 
countries may not directly apply to the Australian market because of the different corporate 
environment—Less stringent governance, high agency costs, weak market for control, high 
ownership concentration and low litigation risk—that has a significant influence on the 
internal governance practices of firms (e.g., Méndez et al., 2015; Monem, 2013). For 
instance, compared to the US, where corporate governance is mandatory, Australian firms are 
subject to a ‘comply or explain’ regime; that is, a firm is required to disclose a reason if it 
does not comply with any governance recommendation. Given such a free environment, we 
expect a larger variation in the corporate governance practices of Australian firms, which 
may influence default risk differently. Furthermore, Australian firms experience higher 
agency cost than the US firms. In such environment, the role of corporate governance as a 
monitoring mechanism is important in reducing agency costs (Henry, 2010). Moreover, 
Australia has a weak market for corporate control (i.e., threat of takeover), compared to the 
US, which makes the internal governance mechanisms more important for Australian firms to 
                                                 
5 Sample periods of 1998 to 2009 (Chiang et al., 2015), 2001 to 2007 (Switzer and Wang, 2013; Schultz et al., 














discipline poorly performing managers. In addition, Australian firms have a much higher 
ownership concentration than the US firms (La Porta e  al., 1998). Since ownership 
concentration may act as a substitute for the internal monitoring mechanisms (e.g., 
independent directors and audit committee), governance practices are likely to vary between 
Australian and the US firms. Finally, the Australian legal environment discourages litigation 
against directors whereas the US legal environment is hospitable to securities lawsuits against 
directors. This suggests a higher level of litigation risk in the US than in Australia (Monem, 
2013). Since litigation risk could increase the directors’ and auditors’ supervisory roles, 
results from the US studies might be difficult to extrapolate to Australia. These differences 
motivate us to investigate the role of corporate governance in determining default risk for 
Australian firms. 
Second, inconclusive findings in the scarce governance–default literature provide another 
reason for Australia as an interesting case. To the best of our knowledge, only two studies 
investigate the role of individual governance mechanisms in the default risk of Australian 
firms (see e.g., Miglani et al., 2015; Schultz et al., 2015). Of these, the study by Schultz et al. 
(2015) is related to our study since it is conducted in an ex-ante setting. Specifically, they 
examine the relationship between individual governance mechanisms (board structure, 
remuneration and ownership variables) and default risk (Merton distance to default) for 222 
healthy firms (932 firm year observations) during the period from 2001 to 2007. Surprisingly, 
their pooled OLS result shows that the proportion of non-executive directors is associated 
with the increase in the probability of the default. Moreover, these results disappear in the 
dynamic panel data setting. Overall, they conclude that the relationship between corporate 
governance and default risk is spurious, due to an endogeneity bias. The findings from their 
study, however, should be interpreted carefully for a number of reasons. First, their study 
does not report the correlation analysis and some of the individual governance variables 
included in the regression are highly correlated, might have caused the results to be 
inconclusive. Second, they consider only the large firms; therefore, the findings may not be 
generalizable to small and medium firms. Second, most of the large firms may have similar 
governance mechanisms and are financially healthy, so the probability of default is near to 
zero, and thus there is little or no variation in both independent (i.e., governance) and 
dependent (i.e., default risk) variables, leading to insignificant association.6 Finally, their 
study does not consider the GFC (2008–2009) and post-GFC (2010 onward) periods, so the 
recent market conditions is ignored.  
Miglani et al. (2015) investigate the association between individual governance 
mechanisms and financial distress in an ex-post setting during the period of 1999 to 2003. 
Based on a sample of 171 financially distressed and 106 healthy firms, the authors suggest 
that the adoption of certain governance mechanisms is beneficial for firms to reduce financial 
distress, even when endogeneity is considered. For instance, they find that the existence of a 
separate audit committee is associated with lower chances of financial distress. However, 
they find no significant association of board independence and CEO duality with financial 
distress. The inconclusive findings, however, are subject to several limitations. First, an ex-
                                                 
6 When we restrict the sample to top 200 firms from 2001 to 2007, we also find no evidence of the effect of 
governance on default risk. Hence, large firms are very similar in terms of their governance quality and 
governance quality is very sticky variable. The inconclusive evidence may possibly be due to the sample used in 














post approach is widely criticized in literature due to sample design. Second, most of the 
financially distressed firms are small in size, and their findings might not be generalizable to 
medium and large firms. Third, their results are based on the voluntary governance 
environment, thus the findings might not be generalizable to the time period after the 
governance reforms (2003). Likewise, using a cross-sectional sample of 38 Australian firms 
in 2004, James-Overheu and Cotter (2009) find that corporate governance index does not 
affect default risk, as measured through credit rating. These inconclusive findings in Australia 
are inconsistent with the spirit of the ASX corporate governance recommendations (i.e., 
higher proportion of independent directors on the board), and therefore, demand further 
investigation: Does corporate governance really affect default risk? To overcome the 
methodological concerns, we have used composite governance index for 1086 Australian 
firms (8950 firm year observations) over the period from 2001 to 2013 covering pre reform, 
post reform, during GFC, and post GFC periods. Moreover, we include two proxies of ex-
ante default risk proxies: Merton distance to default and CDS spread for the robustness 
purpose. Finally, we address endogeneity concern using 2SLS with two instruments (industry 
average and industry-location average) which has not been included in the prior Australian 
studies on governance and default.  
3. Related literature and hypotheses development 
3.1 Corporate governance quality and default risk  
The likelihood of default faced by a firm depends upon whether the firm’s future cash 
flows are sufficient to cover both its debt service costs (interest payments) and the principal 
amount. In general, the likelihood of default increases when a firm experiences a downward 
shift of its average future cash flows or when the future cash flows become more volatile.  
Under the agency theory framework of Jensen and Meckling (1976), the separation of 
ownership and control in the modern corporation raises an information asymmetry problem 
between management and shareholders; that is, the manager has information that 
shareholders do not have. Information asymmetry creates a moral hazard problem where 
managers have an incentive to pursue their own interests and transfer the firm’s wealth to 
themselves at the expense of external stakeholders (Switzer and Wang, 2013). Self-interested 
and opportunistic managerial behavior can include shirking responsibility, overcompensation, 
consumption of perquisites and empire building, which increases the agency risk to the 
shareholders. The increased agency risk decreases the expected value of future cash flows to 
the firm and its shareholders, and increases the volatility of cash flows; thus, it increases the 
risk of default in a firm (Ashbaugh-Skaifea et al., 2006). We therefore hypothesize that 
corporate governance influences the default risk of a firm by controlling the agency cost that 
arises from the agency conflict between management and shareholders (the ‘management 
disciplining’ hypothesis). In firms with better corporate governance, managers are subject to 
close monitoring, which can reduce information asymmetry and enhance the effectiveness of 














expected cash flows and to decrease the volatility of cash flows, and thus decrease the 
chances of default.  
The governance metrics in our study cover four dimensions of corporate governance 
(board structure, and audit, nomination and remuneration committees), consisting of a total of 
17 governance factors. The proportion of independent directors is one of the key features of a 
board’s structure. The ASX CG Council (2003), in Principle 2.1, recommends firms’ boards 
to have a higher proportion of non-executive independent directors (outside directors). 
Outside directors are more effective than executive directors (inside directors) in monitoring 
and controlling the opportunistic behavior of managers (CEOs), and in reducing agency 
problems (Fama and Jensen, 1983). A board dominated by inside directors is relatively weak 
in monitoring the performance of the CEO, as the career path of inside directors can be 
influenced by their CEO; a board dominated by outside directors is expected to be better in 
monitoring and replacing a poorly performing CEO as the future income of outside directors 
is less reliant on the CEO (Weisbach, 1988). Therefore, in the presence of a higher proportion 
of independent directors, a CEO may become sensitive to underperformance and thus make 
more effective decisions, resulting in reduced default risk. Interestingly, contrary to this 
theoretical argument, Australian studies document the insignificant role of independent 
directors in mitigating probability of default and financial distress (Miglani et al., 2015; 
Schultz et al., 2015).  
CEO duality, another important aspect of the board structure, has received much 
attention from researchers and regulators. The ASX CG Council (2003) recommends that 
firms separate the roles of CEO and chair of the board (see principle 2.3), and that an 
independent director should chair the board (see principle 2.2). Agency theory argues that 
one individual should not perform the roles of board chair and CEO simultaneously (Zahra 
and Pearce, 1989). CEO duality is considered as power hoarding which may lead to default 
risk in a firm. However, the empirical evidence of the relationship between CEO duality and 
survival of a firm is inconclusive (Miglani et al., 2015; Schultz et al., 2015; Switzer and 
Wang, 2013).  
The ASX CG Council (2003) states, in Principle 2, that a firm should have a committed 
board that adequately discharges its responsibilities and duties. Since board commitment is 
not directly observable, the frequency of board meetings (i.e., the number of times the board 
meets in a year) can be used as a proxy for board commitment. With more frequent board 
meetings, the board is likely to have richer information about the firm’s operating 
environment. This improves the board’s ability to effectively exercise its monitoring role 
(Rutherford and Buchholtz, 2007), which is beneficial for eliminating information asymmetry 
problem and this improves the chances of a firm’s survival. 
The ASX CG Council (2003), in principles 2.4, 4.2, and 9.2, recommends that firms 
establish board subcommittees: audit, nomination, and remuneration. The specific 
responsibilities of these committees may assist in remedying any poor attendance of directors 














observability of the performance of individual directors and also reduce coordination and 
communication problems. The role of the audit committee has received most academic 
attention. It is regarded as an important internal governance mechanism that assists in the 
reduction of information asymmetry between shareholders and management (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2007). Its interaction with external auditors assists the board to ensure that the 
financial statements represent a true and fair view of the firm’s financial condition (Platt and 
Platt, 2012). Klein (2002) argues that an audit committee composed of independent directors 
improves board effectiveness in monitoring management. Miglani et al. (2015) show that the 
presence of audit committee in a firm reduces the chances of default. In addition, Platt and 
Platt (2012) find that the number of independent directors on the audit and remuneration 
committees of failed firms is fewer than that of non-failed firms. Overall, this evidence 
suggests that the existence and quality of board subcommittees play an effective monitoring 
role and are thus likely to reduce the default risk of firms. 
Following from the above discussion, we hypothesize that: 
H1. All else being equal, better corporate governance (as measured through the quality of 
board and its subcommittees) reduces the default risk. 
3.2 Growth opportunities, corporate governance quality and default risk 
The most comprehensive review of the internal governance mechanisms of listed Australian 
firms, the “Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations”, 
was introduced by the ASX CG Council in March 2003 and subsequently revised in 2007, 
2010 and 2014. The review initially proposes ten principles and contains 28 
recommendations applicable to the governance practices of listed firms in Australia. ASX 
listing rule 4.10.3 [formerly ASX listing rule 3c (3) (i)] requires listed firms to disclose their 
compliance with the CG reforms in their annual report, beginning with the first financial 
reporting year after January 1, 2003. The ASX CG Council, however, recognizes that:  
…Different entities may legitimately adopt different governance practices, based on a range 
of factors, including their size, complexity, history and corporate culture. For that reason, the 
Principles and Recommendations are not mandatory and do not seek to prescribe the 
corporate governance practices that a listed entity must adopt. 
This indicates that best practice recommendations acknowledge the inappropriateness of 
the ‘one size fits all’ approach, that is, firms may adopt particular corporate control systems 
based on certain internal characteristics and the organizational environment. In this study, we 
focus on a firm’s growth opportunity as an organizational environmental factor and posit that 
the predicted negative association between corporate governance and default risk is 
dependent on the growth opportunity. Importantly, none of the prior studies investigate the 
heterogeneity in the governance–default nexus based on growth opportunity. In general, the 
growth opportunity is chosen as a moderator between governance–default linkage because 














monitoring costs (e.g., Hutchinson and Gul, 2004; Lasfer, 2002) that may affect the 
governance choices of such firms and thus affect the default risk in a different way.  
Agency theory suggests that corporate controls (e.g., independent directors) are linked to 
information asymmetry. However, the level of information asymmetry is not the same for all 
firms. As a result, it is not likely that corporate controls reduce default risk for all firms. This 
suggests that corporate controls are more important for firms that may suffer from high 
information asymmetry. The incidence of information asymmetry is higher for growth firms 
because managers may have private information about the value of future projects and hence 
their actions are not readily observed by shareholders. Therefore, high growth firms are 
associated with higher shareholder/manager agency costs, and are in great need for corporate 
controls (Hutchinson and Gul, 2004).  
Prior literature divides firm value into two components (Myers, 1977): the assets in place, 
whose value does not depend on the future investment opportunities of the firm, and the 
growth options, whose value depends on the future discretionary investment decisions. The 
observability of managerial actions decreases as investment opportunities increase (Smith and 
Watts, 1992), because the value of the growth options depends on further managerial 
discretionary expenditures such as maintenance and replacement of existing assets, new 
product lines and capacity expansion projects (Gaver and Gaver, 1993). This suggests that 
monitoring management is more difficult (less difficult) for firms with more growth 
opportunities (fewer growth opportunities). Accordingly, a stream of literature suggests that 
the cost of monitoring managers is more in high growth firms, due to large information 
acquisition and communication costs; therefore, firms with more growth opportunities require 
a lower proportion of independent directors (see e.g., Chen, 2015; Coles et al., 2008; Linck et 
al., 2008; Monem, 2013).  
The question of interest is does the independent governance structure bring more benefit than 
monitoring cost to the shareholders of high growth firms? In this vein, Lyandres and Zhdanov 
(2013) claim that the optimal default strategy of a firm depends on its growth opportunities 
(i.e., mix of growth options and assets in place). They argue that default is costly for the 
shareholders of high growth firms because, in the case of default, shareholders not only 
surrender the right to the profit flow generated by the assets in place but they also abandon 
the right to exercise the investment option in the future. Accordingly, they find that the 
shareholders of a firm with valuable investment opportunities are willing to wait longer 
before defaulting on their contractual debt obligations than shareholders of an otherwise 
identical firm without such investment opportunities. Therefore, shareholders of the high 
growth firm may favour certain governance mechanisms that help such firm to survive. 
Given such evidence, we argue that the benefit of valuable growth opportunities may 
outweigh the cost of monitoring managerial behavior in high growth firms. Therefore, despite 
of the high monitoring cost associated with independent directors in high growth firms, the 
shareholders in such firms are willing to employ corporate controls to curtail the chances of 
the default, and thus keep the rights to the profit flow generated by the assets in place and to 














H2. All else being equal, the inverse relation between corporate governance and default risk 
is stronger for firms with more growth opportunities than for firms with fewer growth 
opportunities. 
3.3 Stock liquidity, corporate governance quality and default risk 
We argue in H1 that corporate governance quality (board and its subcommittees) may 
reduce information asymmetry between management and shareholders, and thus reduce 
default risk. In this section, we further elaborate on this channel by considering stock 
liquidity as a proxy of information asymmetry. Specifically, we discuss two important 
questions: how corporate governance affects stock liquidity, and how stock liquidity affects 
default risk. Overall, we argue that if corporate governance is related to stock liquidity and 
stock liquidity is related to default risk; then it seems appropriate to assume that corporate 
governance may interact with stock liquidity to reduce default risk. 
Better corporate governance imposes more monitoring on managers and, therefore, 
prevents opportunistic managers from concealing and distorting information. Therefore, 
better corporate governance improves information environment of a firm and mitigates 
information asymmetry between insiders (e.g., managers) and outsiders (e.g., investors), as 
well as among outsiders. When information asymmetry is less severe, traders face less 
adverse selection problems (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985); hence, they provide more liquidity 
to stocks of well governed firms. Several empirical studies provide support for this theoretical 
argument by showing that firms with better corporate governance have improved information 
environment (Beekes et al., 2015; Haß et al., 2014) and have improved stock liquidity 
(Chung et al., 2010; Prommin et al., 2014). 
We discuss two views based on which stock liquidity may reduce default risk. The first is 
related to ‘reliance on debt’; the second is related to ‘repayment of debt’. According to the 
first view, stock liquidity should mitigate default risk by reducing the reliance of a firm on 
debt financing. In particular, stock liquidity reduces the cost of equity, thus making the equity 
a cheaper source of finance. The firms with more equity finance are less concerned about the 
debt repayment and thus have lower default risk. In line with this argument, a number of 
empirical studies show that the firms with more liquid stock have a lower cost of equity and 
lower leverage (e.g., Lipson and Mortal, 2009), and the firms with lower leverage have a 
lower default risk. Collett and Hrasky (2005) examine the relationship between the voluntary 
disclosure of information about corporate governance practices and the intention to raise 
external finance using the data of 75 Australian companies in 1994. They find voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance information is positively associated with the intention to 
raise equity capital, but not with the intention to raise debt capital. These findings suggest 
that better governed firms have more equity in the capital structure and are thus less likely to 
default. According to the second view, stock liquidity may also mitigate default risk by 
increasing the ability of a firm to raise external finance in repaying debt at the time of need. 
Since firms require financial resources to repay their debt, it seems appropriate to assume that 














illiquid market. Therefore, if a firm with a debt in its capital structure faces deteriorating 
funding liquidity (availability of internal cash); its ability to repay debt should heavily depend 
on stock liquidity. In other words, when a firm needs external funds to repay debt, stock 
market liquidity is a critical factor in determining the firm’s survivability. Consistent with 
these arguments, Frino et al. (2007) show that the bid–ask spread (a measure of stock 
liquidity) of defaulted firms widens substantially up to seven months prior to failure, 
indicating the likelihood of significant information asymmetries across market participants 
(greater illiquidity) in the defaulted firms. Likewise, Brogaard et al. (2015) find that default 
risk decreases with an increase in stock liquidity.  
Bringing the two streams of literature together—first, the corporate governance and 
information asymmetry (stock liquidity); second, the stock liquidity and default risk—we 
therefore develop the following hypothesis: 
H3. All else being equal, the corporate governance’s reduction in default risk is strengthened 
via the channel of information asymmetry (improved stock liquidity). 
 
4. Data, variables and econometric methods 
4.1 Sample and data 
The initial dataset of 13,500 firm years consists of all the Australian listed firms whose 
corporate governance data are available in SIRCA for the period from 2001 to 2013. The 
sample period is important since it includes the ASX CG reforms (2003) and the GFC (2008). 
Consistent with the prior literature on corporate governance and default risk, and for better 
comparison of results with prior studies (e.g., Chiang et al., 2015; Schultz et al., 2015), we 
exclude financial firms from the sample. Further, financial firms have unique business nature 
and financial characteristics; that is, substantially higher leverage that may significantly affect 
their corporate governance choices and default risk, thus rendering them different from the 
other firms in the sample. We obtain default risk data from the Risk Management Institute at 
the National University of Singapore,7 data for the calculation of stock liquidity from SIRCA, 
and firm characteristics data from Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium databases. The 
inclusion of each firm-year observation in the sample is conditional on the availability of 
corporate governance, default risk, stock liquidity, and firm-specific data. The final sample 
comprises 8851 observations on 1086 non-financial firms8 from all size groups (small, 
medium and large). To eliminate any undue influence of extreme values in the data, possibly 
                                                 
7 This database covers over 60,000 public firms in 106 economies in Asia-Pacific, Europe, Americas, Middle 
East and Africa. It was launched in 2009 to act as a not-for-profit counterbalancing force to the for-profit credit 
rating agencies (Duan and Van Laere, 2012). 
8 The highest number of observations is from Materials (32.78%), followed by Industrials (15.54%), Consumer 
Discretionary (13.31%) and Energy (13.12%). The remaining sectors (Consumer Staples, Health Care, 















due to spurious outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized to the 5th and 95th 
percentiles. 
4.2 Measuring default risk 
The dependent variable in our study is the default risk (DEFAULT). Since the seminal 
work of Beaver (1966), a number of accounting and market-based default risk models have 
been developed in the literature. The validity of accounting-based models has been 
questioned, due to the backward-looking nature of the financial statement through which 
these models are derived. On the other hand, market-based models using the option pricing 
approach developed by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) provide an appealing 
alternative to the prediction of default risk conditions of listed firms. Such a methodological 
approach overcomes the criticisms of accounting-based models through the forward-looking 
nature of market data. Market data reflect expectations of a firm’s future cash flows, and 
hence should be more appropriate for prediction purposes. Another prevalent feature of such 
models is their provision of a ‘finer’ volatility assessment that aids in predicting the risk of 
default. Empirical studies such as Gharghori et al. (2006) and Hillegeist et al. (2004) find that 
Merton (1974) market-based model is superior to their accounting counterparts in predicting 
default in the Australian and US context, respectively. We therefore use the market-based 
Merton (1974) distance to default (DD) in gauging default risk (see Appendix A: General 
procedure to calculate DD).9  
We also check the robustness of the results by using market-based credit default swap 
spread (CDS) to proxy the pricing of default risk. CDS are credit derivatives that allow the 
transfer of the firm’s default risk between two agents for a predetermined time period. In a 
typical CDS contract, the protection seller offers the protection buyer insurance against the 
default of an underlying bond issued by a certain company (the reference entity). In an event 
of default by the reference entity, the seller commits to buy the bond for a price equal to its 
face value from the protection buyer.10 In exchange for the insurance, the buyer pays a 
quarterly premium, called the CDS spread, quoted as an annualized percentage of the notional 
value insured. Therefore, by definition, the CDS is the pricing of the default risk. The higher 
the default risk of the reference entity, the higher is the CDS. Tang and Yan (2010) find that 
the CDS captures the major portion of the firm level determinants of default risk. Thus, it 
should serve as an alternative measure of a firm’s default risk conditions.  
4.3 Measuring corporate governance quality  
The key independent variable in our study is corporate governance quality (CGQ). We 
construct a CG index by generally following the methodology of the Horwath report to 
                                                 
9 We also note some limitations of the market-based models. In particular, it is difficult to measure default risk 
of a firm who is not trading on the stock market. Moreover, to accurately predict default risk, market-based 
models require the market transparency and liquidity. Importantly, market-based models have a number of 
assumptions that in practice may not hold. For example, the DD assumes that asset values follow a lognormal 
process, which will not capture extreme events adequately. 














capture the CGQ for each of the considered firms. This report pays special attention to the 
aspects that have been viewed as important in governance best-practice codes in Australia 
and elsewhere (USA Blue Ribbon Committee Report 1999 [The Business Lawyer 1999]; 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Principles of Good Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations 2003 [ASX CG Council 2003]; the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Report 2004). Unlike the well-renowned US based 
Gompers et al. (2003) governance index (i.e., G-index), which focuses on the resistance of 
firms to external control mechanisms, the Horwath report places emphasis on the quality of a 
firm’s internal structures and processes. The Horwath report provides composite ratings 
based on six categories; namely, (1) board structure, (2) audit committee, (3) nomination 
committee, (4) remuneration committee, (5) external auditor independence, and (6) codes of 
conduct and other policy disclosures (see Appendix B: Horwath corporate governance report, 
2008).11 
Multiple aspects may limit the generalizability of the findings obtained through the 
Horwath report. First, the Horwath report includes the top 250 firms each year; thus, the 
findings may not be generalizable to medium and small firms. Second, the report is available 
up to 2008; therefore, missing out market developments, particularly after the GFC. Third, 
full details of the Horwath rating system are proprietary and confidential, so we are unable to 
make any comments on the assignment of ranking beyond the information given in the 
reports. In addition, two of the six categories in the Horwath report are subjective. This may 
limit the implications of the findings for investors because they may not be able to replicate 
the entire Horwath ratings. Fourth, the Horwath report does not provide the sub-category 
scores, so it is not possible to explore which governance category influence default risk. 
We address these issues by collecting an extended CG dataset across both cross-section 
(small, medium, and large firms) and time-series (2001–2013) on the objective Horwath 
categories containing 17 governance criteria. To construct the CG index, we use equally 
weighted scoring methodology that has been used by extant corporate governance literature 
(e.g., Gompers et al., 2003). We assign the value 1 if a firm meets the particular criteria and 0 
otherwise. For instance, if the majority of directors in a firm are independent we assign 1, and 
otherwise 0. These individual values are then aggregated to construct a composite CG index, 
which ranges from 0 to 17 where 0 indicates the ‘worst’ governance and 17 indicates the 
‘best’ governance. Each governance category i.e., board, audit, nomination and remuneration 
quality is the aggregate of its respective individual criteria (see Appendix C: Simplified 
corporate governance index). 
4.4 Measuring growth opportunities 
Following Lyandres and Zhdanov (2013), we measure firm’s growth opportunities using 
the market-to-book ratio (MTB); that is, the market value of an equity divided by its book 
value. The market value is defined as the product of the number of common shares 
                                                 
11 Categories 1–4 are based on objective criteria and categories 5–6 are based on subjective criteria. More details 














outstanding and the financial-year-end share price. Higher MTB implies higher growth 
opportunities. To check the robustness of the results, we use Tobin’s Q as an alternative 
proxy for growth opportunities (Hutchinson and Gul, 2004). It is the market value of assets 
divided by book value of assets. The higher the Tobin’s Q, the higher is the growth 
opportunity.  
4.5 Measuring stock liquidity 
Stock liquidity is considered a ‘slippery and elusive concept’ (Kyle, 1985: p. 1316) due 
to number of transactional properties of the market, including tightness (trading cost), depth 
(price impact) and resiliency. Tightness represents the cost of turning around a position over 
a short period of time. Depth refers to the ability of the market to absorb a large quantity of 
trade without having a large price impact. Resiliency is the speed with which the prices return 
to equilibrium after a large trade.12 Black (1971) suggests another stock liquidity dimension, 
immediacy, which represents the trading speed, i.e., the speed with which buy or sell orders 
can be executed. Prior stock liquidity research normally does not rely on one single measure 
of stock liquidity because each measure proxies different dimensions and has its own 
limitations (Goyenko et al., 2009); therefore, we use three proxies for stock liquidity (as a 
measure of information asymmetry) that capture trading cost, price impact and immediacy 
dimensions. In particular, we use a time-weighted quoted spread (TWQS) capturing trading 
cost dimension, the Amihud illiquidity estimate (AMIHUD) capturing price impact 
dimension, and the turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM) capturing immediacy 
dimension. Higher TWQS, AMIHUD, and LM indicate lower stock liquidity. However, we 
convert each of them into a dummy variable coded 1 (indicating higher stock liquidity) if the 
value is below the sample median, otherwise zero (indicating lower stock liquidity).  
TWQS, a high frequency proxy, is a widely used measure of stock liquidity in the 
microstructure literature and is considered as a direct measure of trading cost. The bid-ask 
spread widens when information asymmetry is high because, in such circumstances, 
uninformed traders shift orders away from the market and decrease the likelihood of trading 
with informed traders. We measure TWQS as an average of daily ratio between the time-
weighted bid–ask spread (TWBAS) and the time-weighted mid-point price (TWMPP) in a 
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12 Chai et al. (2010) find that the return reversal effect is small in the Australian market due to the absence of 














where			is the time-weighted bid-ask spread of firm i on day d of year t, 
())	 is the time-weighted mid-point price of firm i on day d of year t, / is the 
number of days with available data for firm i in year t. 01 and 23 are the best available ask 
and bid prices on the limit order book; 2456 represents the time period that the bid ask 
spread remained in existence. The higher TWQS indicates lower stock liquidity. 
 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity estimate (AMIHUD), a low frequency proxy, is used to 
measure the daily price impact of the order flow—the premium that a buyer pays or the 
discount that a seller concedes when executing a market order—that results from inventory 
and adverse selection costs. Prior studies such as Huang and Stoll (1996) on informed trading 
claim that price impact of trade captures information asymmetry as trade conveys private 
information. A large trade may attract other traders because there is a possibility that trade is 
information motivated. For example, a large sale may signal bad news while a large purchase 
may signal good news. A number of empirical studies show that ILLIQ is a reliable measure 
stock liquidity (Goyenko et al., 2009). It is measured as the daily ratio of absolute stock 
return to trading volume in Australian dollars, averaged over a number of trading days in the 








         (4) 
where |>| is the absolute stock return of firm i on day d of year t, ?@8/ is the trading 
volume of firm i on day d of year t, and /A is the number of days with available data for firm 
i in year t. The higher the ILLIQ, the lower is the stock liquidity. 
 
Liu (2006) proposes a turnover-adjusted zero daily volume (LM) as a new measure of 
stock liquidity. Although LM captures multiple dimensions of liquidity, it places a particular 
focus on immediacy. It is measured as: 
8( = BCDE? +	 GH6IJ"H
⁄ 	"LMNIH O P	 QRQSI	      (5) 
where CDE? is the number of zero daily trading volumes for firm i in year t; TUVWDX5V, is 
the stock turnover for firm i in year t; CD/ is the total number of trading days in year t; and 
the deflator is set to 480,000 as suggested in Liu (2006). Multiplication by the factor 
QRQ
SI	 
standardizes the number of trading days in a year to 252 and therefore makes LM comparable 
over time. The higher the LM, the lower is the stock liquidity. The NoZV component of LM 
is an indicator of illiquidity–the higher the number of days with zero trading volume, the less 
frequent the trade and, therefore, the less liquid the stock. It reflects the trade continuity and 
potential delay in trade execution (Liu, 2006). 
4.6 Control variables 
We also include several control variables in the regression models from prior literature to 














(LIQUID), leverage (TLTA), firm size (Ln(TA)), firm age, (Ln(AGE) , year effects (YR), and 
industry effects (IND). The definition of each variable is in Table 1.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
4.7 Empirical models and estimation methods 
To test the inverse effect of corporate governance quality on default risk (H1), we 
specify regression Eq. (6) as follows: 
/Z[\8, =	]I + ̂_`, +	^Q>@, +	^a8, + b̂87\7/, + ^R8W`Z,
+	^c 8W, 	+ 	^d(, + e> +	f,																																																							6 
Where subscript i denotes the individual firm (i  = 1,2,…,1086), t equals the time period (t = 
2001, 2002,…,2013), 8W is the natural logarithm, ̂ is parameter to be estimated, and f, is 
the composite error including either industry dummies 7C/ + idiosyncratic error (?,) or 
firm dummies [2V4 + idiosyncratic error (	?, to control for the industry and firm fixed 
effects, respectively. DEFAULT = default risk proxy measures (either DD or CDS); CGQ = 
corporate governance quality proxy measures (CG index, board, audit, remuneration and 
nomination). The definition and details of the variables are as outlined in sections 4.2, 4.3, 
and 4.6 and are summarized in Table 1.  
To test the corporate governance quality, growth opportunities and default risk 
hypothesis (H2), we formulate regression Eq. (7) as follows: 
/Z[\8, =	]I + ̂_`, +	^Q(,	 +	^a_`, ∗ (, + b̂>@, +	^R8,
+ ^c87\7/, + ^d8W`Z, +	^i8W, 	+	e> +	f,																				7 
where MTB = market to book value of equity; CGQ*MTB = an interaction term comprising 
CGQ multiplied by MTB. The definition and details of the variables are as outlined in 
sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.6 and are summarized in Table 1.  Eq. (2) measures the partial 
effect of CGQ on default risk when growth opportunities are zero. Since it is very rare for the 
firms to have zero growth opportunities (MTB), the interpretation of the CGQ coefficient 
would be meaningless. Thus, we measure the partial effect of CGQ on default risk at 
increasing levels of growth opportunities and specify it in regression Eq. (8) as follows: 
/Z[\8, = ]I + ̂_`, + ^Q(,	 + ^a_`, ∗ k(,	 − mn + b̂>@,
+ ^R8, + ^c87\7/, + ^d8W`Z, + ^i oW, 	+ e> +	f,	8 
where m take values from 10%, 25%, 50%, 75% or 90% for MTB. The coefficient ̂ 
measures the partial effect of CGQ on default risk when µ1 takes the value from 10% to 90% 
for growth opportunities (see Wooldridge, 2006, pp. 204–206).  
To test the corporate governance quality, stock liquidity and default risk hypothesis (H3), 














/Z[\8, = ]I + ̂_`, +	^Q87,	 + ^a_`, ∗ 87, + b̂>@, + ^R8,
+ ^c87\7/, + ^d8W`Z, + ^i8W, + ^q(, + e> + f,			9 
where SLIQ = stock liquidity dummy variables (TWQS, AMIHUD and LM), coded 1 (greater 
stock liquidity) if the value is below sample median, otherwise zero (lower stock liquidity); 
and CGQ*SLIQ = an interaction term comprising CGQ multiplied by SLIQ dummy 
variables. The definition and details of the variables are as outlined in sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.5, 
and 4.6 and are summarized in Table 1. 
To test three hypotheses, first, we employ pooled ordinary least square (OLS) including 
industry fixed effect. Then we employ the firm fixed effect (FE) method to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity due to time-unvarying omitted variables that differ across firms but 
are constant over time. While estimating the effects of independent variables on dependent 
variables, FE method focuses on overtime changes in the variables. Since this method focuses 
on the time-series variation between CGQ and default risk, and a causal relation between 
them can be examined using their time-series covariation, FE provides an additional insight 
into the empirical linkage between CGQ and default risk.13 In both OLS and FE methods the 
standard errors are clustered by firm to control for heteroskedasticity and within-firm 
correlation in the residuals (Petersen, 2009). 
One may raise concern about reverse causality between CGQ and default risk that is, not 
only better CGQ leads to a lower default risk, but also higher default risk may trigger changes 
in CGQ simultaneously (Schultz et al., 2015). In other words, the firms facing high default 
risk may reconfigure their governance structure as a remedy to fix the deteriorating 
performance. We use three alternative model specifications to address this potential 
endogeneity concern. The first alternative replaces the contemporaneous values of CGQ and 
other control variables with one- or two-year lagged values. While regressions based on 
lagged values of independent variables might not remove endogeneity due to reverse 
causality, it would help mitigate the resulting bias in estimation. 
The second alternative specification uses a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach to 
further address the reverse causality issue. This 2SLS requires an instrumental variable (IV) 
that is strongly correlated with CGQ but does not have a direct influence default risk. 
Following Jiraporn et al. (2011), Liu et al. (2014), Yang and Zhao (2014), and Liu et al.
(2015), we use the average CGQ of all the firms in firm i’s industry (excluding firm i’s score) 
as an IV. The intuition behind using industry-average CGQ as an IV is that a firm’s 
governance arrangements (such as board and its subcommittees) might be highly related with 
the industry peers due to similar business mix and investment opportunities, but such industry 
average is unlikely to directly affect a firm’s default risk (Yang and Zhao, 2014). Further to 
this, managers may influence governance choices of their own firm, but should have little or 
no influence on the governance choices of other firms. Given these arguments, industry-
average CGQ should be a valid instrument: it is unrelated to firm-level default risk but related 
                                                 
13 We perform the Hausman test (Durbin, 1954; Hausman, 1978; Wu, 1973) to decide whether fixed effect (FE) 














to firm-level CGQ. To cope with any counterarguments for IV,14 we assess the relevance and 
validity of the IV using the F-test for the joint significance of the instrument. A general rule 
of thumb is that if the F-statistics is more than 10 the IV is not weak (Staiger and Stock, 
1997). As another point of check, we also test for the relevance of the IV using the Cragg-
Donald (C-D) Wald test. IV is not classified as weak if the C-D statistic exceeds the Stock-
Yogo critical value at 5% level (Stock and Yogo, 2005).  
The third alternative specification includes a lagged default risk into main regression and 
estimates the augmented regression using the Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) dynamic two-step system GMM. In the dynamic system GMM, first-differenced 
variables are used as internal instruments for the equations in levels and the estimates are 
robust to endogeneity bias, if any (Pathan, 2009). 15 Compared to the 2SLS method, dynamic 
GMM has at least two benefits. First, it handles the endogeneity bias with internally 
generated instruments rather than external instruments or natural experiments that may not be 
readily available. Second, it explicitly models the dynamic nature of the governance–default 
nexus by including prior year default risk as one of the regressors. The consistency of GMM 
estimation depends on two important conditions. The first condition is the serial 
independence of the residuals. The residuals in the first difference should be serially 
correlated (AR1) by way of construction but the residuals in the second difference should not 
be serially correlated (AR2). The second condition is the validity of instruments, which is 
tested through the Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions. The Hansen J-statistics 
of over-identifying restrictions tests the null hypothesis of instrument validity. We test the 
validity of these assumptions in the empirical results. 
4.8 Descriptive statistics 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics such as mean and standard deviation for the 
variables for whole sample and for the three sub-samples: pre reform (2001 to 2003), Post 
reform and pre GFC (2004 to 2007), post GFC (2010 to 2013). The default risk variables 
show that the mean DD (CDS) is 3.52 (1.91) with a standard deviation of 2.50 (1.62). 
Overall, the default risk in the sample firms is low, implying that the firms are generally in 
good financial health. With regard to the CGQ variables, the average of the CG index is 8.53 
(out of 17), suggesting that, on average, the CG structure of the sample firms is generally 
good and meets most of the best practice standards. The descriptive statistics of the firm 
characteristics indicate that the sample firms have average total assets of AUD $436 million. 
On average, the sample firms carry 38% debt (TLTA) in their capital structure and have a 
return on assets (ROA) of -15%. Liquidity (LIQUID) and growth opportunities (MTB) 
                                                 
14 Industry level default risk may influence particular firms and will in turn influence their CGQ and the 
industry’s CGQ by aggregation.  














average 5.39 and 2.51 respectively. On average, the sample firms are 14.68 years old.16 In 
terms of sub-periods, we do observe the improvement in governance and reduction in default 
risk in the period after the reform compared to the pre reform period. However, the firm 
characteristics do not change substantially.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 3 provides year-wise and sector-wise descriptive statistics of the overall index 
(17 provisions) and sub-indices (i.e., board quality [3 provisions], audit quality [6 
provisions], nomination quality [4 provisions], and remuneration quality [4 provisions]. Over 
the sample period, the governance quality of Australian firms has improved. For instance, 
overall index has increased from 6.26 in year 2001 to 10.31 in year 2013. Among the sub-
indices, nomination quality in 2013 is the lowest (1.63 out of 4.00), followed by remuneration 
quality (2.38 out of 4.00), audit quality (4.03 out of 6.00) and board quality (2.27 out of 
3.00). With regard to the sectors, consumer staples (material) outperformed (underperformed) 
in the overall index and sub-indices quality. Overall, from these descriptive statistics, we 
infer that the high (low) governance quality of any particular sector is supported by the high 
(low) scores in all sub-indices. 
5. Does CGQ affect default risk (H1)? 
5.1 Main results 
We first examine if CGQ has a significant impact on default risk (H1). Table 4 presents 
the results of Eq. (6), where CGQ is measured by the self-constructed CG index and default 
risk is measured by DD and CDS. The results for DD and CDS as dependent variables are 
reported in columns 1–2 and 3–4, respectively. With regards to alternative methods, the 
results based on the pooled OLS method are presented in columns 1 and 3; and the FE 
method in columns 2 and 4. Industry and year fixed effects are controlled in the OLS method; 
firm and year fixed effects are controlled in FE method.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
As hypothesized, the overall results indicate that CGQ has a negative and statistically 
significant relationship with default risk, suggesting that better-governed firms experience a 
lower level of default risk. For instance, with the OLS method, a 1 point rise in CG index 
increases DD and decreases CDS by 0.021 points. With the FE method, a 1 point rise in CG 
index increases DD by 0.036 points and decreases CDS by 0.021 points.17 The economic 
                                                 
16 The correlation analysis indicates that CG index and governance categories have a strong positive (negative) 
correlation with DD (CDS), suggesting better governed firms have a lower level of default risk. For brevity, we 
do not report these results. 
17 OLS regression captures the cross-sectional (across firms) and time-series (within) variation. However, fixed 
effect regression captures only the time series variation. Furthermore, if OLS results are significant and FE 
results are insignificant than it means our results are biased due to omitted variable bias. However, we notice 
that both OLS and FE method provide significant results. This finding suggests that omitted variable bias is less 














significance of this result is also important. For instance, an increase in the CG index by one 
(sample) standard deviation would increase (decrease) DD (CDS) by approximately 4.69% 
(5.10%).18 Therefore, the results provide support for H1, indicating that better governed firms 
are likely to face a lower level of default risk. On the one hand, the composite CGQ based 
findings are consistent with the literature that argues better governance mechanisms reduce 
the agency problem, leading to reduction in the level of default risk (Chiang et al., 2015; 
Switzer and Wang, 2013). On the other hand, these findings provide guidelines for investors 
to use composite CGQ as a benchmark in the selection of stocks that are less likely to face 
default risk.19,20  
With the FE method, the coefficients on the firm characteristics variables also offer an 
important insight. For instance, as expected, the positive (negative) and statistically 
significant coefficient on ROA indicates that, as a firm becomes more profitable, the DD 
(CDS) increases (decreases) and the default risk decreases. In line with the prediction, the 
coefficient on TLTA is negative (positive) and statistically significant at 1% level with DD 
(CDS), which indicates that the firm’s leverage increases the default risk. The coefficient on 
LIQUID is positive (negative) with DD (CDS) at the 1% significance level, which shows that 
firms with higher liquidity experience lower default risk. Similarly, the positive (negative) 
coefficient on Ln(AGE) for DD (CDS) indicates that default risk diminishes as the firm 
survives longer (i.e. is listed for a longer period). Consistent with greater diversification 
benefits, the positive (negative) coefficient on L  (TA) significant at the 1% level with DD 
(CDS) indicates that firm size lowers default risk. Likewise, the coefficient on MTB is 
positive (negative) and statistically significant at the 1% level with DD and (CDS), implying 
that the default risk is less in firms with more growth opportunities. 
The empirical evidence so far demonstrates a strong negative impact of CGQ on default 
risk. Now, we examine if governance categories (board, audit, nomination, and remuneration 
quality) have a significant impact on default risk. Specifically, we aim to understand which 
specific governance categories drive the results. Since some of the governance categories are 
correlated, we run separate regressions for each category to avoid multicollinearity problems. 
The results are reported in Table 5. As can be seen, all the governance categories are 
significantly related to the default risk. Overall, the evidence suggests that the relationship 
between CGQ and default risk is driven, not by a few, but by all governance categories. The 
impact of CGQ on default risk seems to be more general, not specific to any particular group 
                                                 
18 We multiply the standard deviation of CG index i.e., 4.59 with the coefficient on CG index i.e., 0.036 in 
column 2 Table 4, and get 0.165. Therefore, an increase in the CG index by one standard deviation improves 
DD by 0.165. As the mean DD is 3.53, an increase by 0.165 denotes a change by 4.68% of the average DD. 
19 We also find that the inverse effect of governance on default risk holds in all the three sub-samples: pre-
reform (years 2001 to 2003), post-reform and pre-GFC (years 2004 to 2007), and post-GFC (years 2010 to 
2013) but the results are stronger for the period after the reform and before GFC compared to other two sub-
samples. Overall, we infer that the negative effect of governance on default risk is applicable to current market 
conditions i.e., post-GFC. 
20 We have done robustness check to only log transformations and winsorinsing at the more conventional 1% 
level. Specifically, we keep the key independent variable (CG index) at its original values as we observed no 
problem of outlier in the descriptive statistics. We also keep the dependent variables (DD and CDS) at their 
original values as extreme values on DD and CDS indicate worst performance (bankruptcy). To remove the 
potential outlier problems, we took the natural log of total assets (firm size) and firm age, and winsorized all 














of governance provisions. However, it might be noted that there is a larger coefficient of 
board quality than those of the other categories. This is consistent with the notion that board 
quality (proportion of independent directors, absence of CEO duality and board meetings) is 
directly related to management control, preventing them from distorting information, 
reducing information asymmetry, and thus mitigating default risk. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
On the one hand, this finding is in contrast to the prior Australian studies who find an 
insignificant relationship of board independence and CEO duality with default (Miglani et l., 
2015; Schultz et al., 2015). On the other hand, we support the prior study of Daily and Dalton 
(1994), who find no individual effect of governance characteristics on bankruptcy; rather, an 
interaction effect of governance characteristics on bankruptcy; that is, the firms which are 
characterized with lower proportions of independent directors and that have CEO duality are 
more likely to collapse. Overall, these findings are in line with the argument that firms should 
focus on improving the governance quality as a whole if they wish to create value (Henry, 
2008), and thus reduce the chances of default. 
5.2 Potential endogeneity  
As mentioned in section 4.7, the relationship between governance quality and default risk 
is spurious due to the endogeneity bias. We use three ways to address this potential 
endogeneity concern. First, we re-estimate Eq. (6) by using the current period’s values of the 
DD (CDS) (i.e., year t) and the prior period’s CGQ and control variables (i.e., year t-1). Table 
6 reports the results of lagged independent variables in columns 1–2 for DD and columns 3–4 
for CDS. The new estimates are virtually indistinguishable from the results reported in Table 
4. The relation of CGQ with default risk is significantly negative at lag 1, lag 2 and lag 3 
specifications.21 The evidence supports the interpretation that past CGQ influences current 
default risk, rather than past default risk influencing the current choice of CGQ. These results 
not only provide an additional support to the principal results but also suggest that CGQ has 
an ability to predict default risk, i.e., a high level in the CGQ ‘current year’ leads to a lower 
level of default risk ‘next year’.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Second, we use an instrumental variable approach, 2SLS, to address the endogeneity bias 
and report the results in Panel A of Table 7. Column 1 contains the first-stage regression 
results. The coefficient on industry-average CGQ is positive and statistically significant at 
1% level, implying that industry-average CGQ strongly explain firm-level CGQ. This shows 
the validity of IV because of its statistical power to explain firm-level CGQ. Moreover, the 
IV also passes the relevance test as the F-statistics is 432.89 that is well above 10 and is 
significant at 1 % level. Columns 2 and 3 present the second-stage regression results, where 
either DD or CDS is the dependent variable (DEFAULT). We replace CGQ with the fitted 
CGQ from the first-stage regression. The coefficient on the fitted CGQ is positive (negative) 
for DD (CDS) and statistically significant, confirming the earlier findings, i.e., better CGQ 
                                                 
21 For brevity we do not report the results of lag 2 and lag 3. The results are similar when we take lag values of 














reduces the default risk of firms. The 2SLS results remain unaffected when we use alternative 
methods, i.e., information maximum likelihood and GMM. Thus, we conclude that the results 
are robust to the use of the 2SLS approach. 
As a robustness check, we use industry-location-average of corporate governance as an 
additional IV as suggested by Fisman and Svensson (2007) in their study on corruption. The 
use of industry-location average as an instrument not only overcomes the potential 
endogeneity of corporate governance, the bias from unobservable factors, but also mitigates 
measurement error in the data (Fisman and Svensson, 2007). A firm’s corporate governance 
includes two elements:  
btuv = Btuv + Buv																																																																																																																																10  
while Btuv is corporate governance of firm i in industry j at time t by idiosyncratic reasons, Buv 
is the share of corporate governance by reasons relating to specific sector in a certain 
geographical location at time t. We conduct two-stage empirical estimation procedure. First, 
the location-industry-average corporate governance (Buv) along with other exogenous 
variables are used to estimate the fitted values for (btuv. Then, we model default risk as a 
function of the fitted values from the first-stage regression and other exogenous variables. 
The unreported results provide additional support for the hypothesis that corporate 
governance has a significant negative effect on default risk.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Third, we use dynamic panel data estimation techniques to address the endogeneity bias. 
Panel B of Table 7 reports the results for DD and CDS in columns 4–6 and 7–9, respectively. 
With regards to alternative methods, the results based on the dynamic pooled OLS method 
are presented in columns 4 and 7; the dynamic FE method in columns 5 and 8; and the 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) dynamic two-step system 
generalized method of moments (GMM) in columns 6 and 9.22 In the dynamic system GMM, 
first-differenced variables are used as instruments for the equations in levels and the 
estimates are robust to unobserved heterogeneity, reverse causality and dynamic endogeneity 
(if any). The diagnostics tests show that models 4–9 are well-fitted with statistically 
insignificant test statistics for the second-order autocorrelation in the second differences 
(AR2) and for the Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions. The interpretation of the 
coefficients on the G index remains qualitatively the same as in Table 4. Specifically, the 
statistically significant positive (negative) coefficients on the CG index for DD (CDS) across 
all the alternative specification of the dynamic panel data technique suggest that better CGQ 
is inversely related to default risk. Overall, the system GMM estimates support the notion 
that, even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic 
                                                 
22 The dynamic pooled OLS and FE are reported to see if the coefficient of lagged DD (0.440) in the dynamic 














endogeneity, better governance is associated with default risk in a way that is consistent with 
the expectation.23  
Several empirical studies also suggest natural experiment as a state-of-the-art solution to 
the endogeneity problem (see e.g., Black et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2015; Gippel et al., 2015). 
However, such a methodology requires a purely exogenous natural event. In the context of 
our study, one may suggest considering ASX CG reforms as a natural experiment; however, 
we are unable to use the reform as a natural experiment because the reform is not a mandate 
(i.e., quota law); rather, it is non-mandate (i.e., ‘comply or explain’). Therefore, the change in 
firm-level corporate governance is still at the discretion of the firm and thus the impact of the 
reform is not credibly exogenous. In addition, the use of law changes and reforms as a natural 
experiment has recently been challenged by Karpoff and Wittry (2015).  
Overall, we acknowledge that it is often difficult, if not impossible, to eliminate 
endogeneity completely. However, the various tests, based on lagged independent variables, 
2SLS analysis and dynamic system GMM, should provide a certain degree of comfort that 
even when endogeneity due to reverse-causality is considered, the main findings regarding 
CGQ to default risk do not change. These findings contrast with the findings of Schultz et al. 
(2015), and provide empirical support to the development of comprehensive code of 
corporate governance practices in Australia. 
6. Growth opportunities and the impact of CGQ on default risk (H2) 
In this section, we investigate the role of growth opportunities in the relationship 
between CGQ and default risk (H2). To test this hypothesis, we first do the bivariate analysis 
by means of correlation metrics. We classify the sample firms into 5 quantiles, where quantile 
1 consists of the low growth firms and quantile 5 consists of the high growth firms. The 
results reported in Table 8a reveal that when we move from low growth firms to high growth 
firms, the positive (negative) correlation between CG index and DD (CDS) has strengthened, 
meaning that CGQ significantly reduces default risk for the firms with more growth 
opportunities.  
[Insert Table 8a here] 
Second, we do the multivariate regression analysis. As specified in Eq. (7), Table 8b in 
Panel A presents the interaction effect of governance quality and growth opportunities on 
default risk in columns 1–2 and 3–4 for DD and CDS, respectively. With regard to alternative 
methods, the results based on the pooled OLS method are presented in columns 1 and 2; and 
the FE method in columns 2 and 4. 
[Insert Table 8b here] 
Overall, the coefficient on the interaction term (CG index*MTB) is statistically 
significant. More specifically, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive (negative) for 
                                                 














DD (CDS) and statistically significant at the 1% level across all alternative methods. These 
results suggest a moderation effect that the firms with better governance and more growth 
opportunities have a lower level of default risk. However, the coefficient on CGQ is negative 
(positive) for DD (CDS) and statistically significant across most of the estimation methods, 
implying that the CGQ increases default risk for low growth firms. Given such findings, we 
further explore the partial effect of CGQ on default risk at an increasing level of growth 
opportunities (10%, 25%, 50%, 75% or 90%) as specified in Eq. (8). The results reported in 
Panel B of Table 8 indicate that better CGQ does not seem to be associated with statistically 
significant lower default risk for low growth firms (MTB 10%). However, better CGQ is 
found to sharply reduce the default risk for a firm with more growth opportunities (MTB 
90%). In fact, the slope (positive for DD and negative for CDS) appears to be more than 5 
times steeper. The significant positive (negative) coefficient on CGQ for DD (CDS), confined 
to firms with more growth opportunities, indicates that CGQ reduces the default risk for firms 
with more growth opportunities but it does not do so for firms with fewer growth 
opportunities. The results (unreported) remain similar when we use an alternative proxy for 
growth opportunities (Tobin’s Q) and with the individual governance categories (board, 
audit, nomination and remuneration). Therefore, we strongly accept H2.24 
The economic meaning behind this finding is that effective CGQ reduces default risk by 
mitigating the information asymmetry problem between management and shareholders. Since 
high growth firms have plenty of simultaneous investment activities, compared to low growth 
firms, the high growth firms may have a more information-based asymmetry problem. These 
findings suggest that the role of CGQ is important in reducing default risk in a high growth 
firm which may suffer more from an information asymmetry problem. Overall, these results 
support the empirical literature that argues the relationship between CGQ and firm 
performance should be examined in the context of growth opportunities (see e.g., Hutchinson 
and Gul, 2004). Moreover, these findings complement the literature that argues the effect of 
CGQ on corporate outcomes is not homogenous across different types of firms (e.g., Coles et
al., 2008). Specifically, this heterogeneity in the governance–default nexus provides 
empirical support to the ‘comply or explain’ governance regime in Australia and suggests 
that, while designing their corporate governance structure, firms should consider their growth 
conditions. 
7. Stock liquidity and the impact of CGQ on default risk (H3) 
In this section, we investigate the role of stock liquidity as the channel in the relationship 
between CGQ and default risk (H3). As specified in Eq. (9), Table 9 presents the interaction 
effect of corporate governance quality and stock liquidity on default risk in columns 1–3 for 
DD and columns 4–6 for CDS. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
                                                 














Overall, the regression coefficient on the interaction term between CGQ and stock 
liquidity (i.e., CG index*TWQS, CG index*AMIHUD, and CG index*LM in the regression 
models) is statistically significant. More specifically, the regression coefficient on CG 
index*TWQS, CG index*AMIHUD, and CG index*LM are positive (negative) for DD (CDS) 
and statistically significant across all model specifications. Accordingly, H3 is supported by 
the results, suggesting that the firms with better corporate governance quality and greater 
stock liquidity have a significantly lower level of default risk.25 Furthermore, as expected, we 
also find that the coefficient on TWQS, AMIHUD, and LM is positive (negative) for DD 
(CDS), suggesting that greater stock liquidity reduces default risk. These findings are in line 
with the study by Frino et al. (2007) and Brogaard et al. (2015), who show an increase in 
default risk for firms with poor stock liquidity. 
Overall, this finding complements the two streams of literature: (1) corporate governance 
and stock liquidity (e.g., Chung et al., 2010), and (2) stock liquidity and default risk (e.g., 
Brogaard et al., 2015). Specifically, these results indicate the benefits of having a more 
independent governance structure in reducing default risk, through eliminating information 
asymmetry and improving stock liquidity. In other words, these findings suggest that firms 
with low stock liquidity should strive for high governance standards if they are to avoid 
future defaults. 
To check the robustness, we use a split sample strategy to explore if corporate 
governance has a stronger effect on default risk for the firms that have low information 
asymmetry (i.e., firms with high stock liquidity). Using TWQS, Amihud, and LM, we split 
the sample into firms with high liquidity and firms with low liquidity. We classify a firm in a 
high liquidity (low liquidity) category if TWQS, Amihud, and LM are below (above) the 
sample median. Table 10 presents the fixed effect regression results. For low liquidity firms, 
CGQ does not seem to be associated with a statistically significant lower default risk. 
However, CGQ is found to sharply reduce default risk of firms with high stock liquidity. 
These findings confirm that corporate governance reduces default risk because it mitigates 
information asymmetry problems. Therefore, H3 of our study is strongly accepted. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
8. Internet Appendix: Additional analyses on does CGQ affect default risk 
(H1)? 
In this section, we check the robustness of the main results (H1) to alternative default 
risk proxies, to alternative control variables, and to financial constraints. For the interest of 
brevity, the results are included in an internet appendix to this paper. First, we show that 
inverse relation of CGQ with default risk is robust to alternative proxy of default risk (i.e., 
                                                 
25 We repeat the analysis by using the continuous stock liquidity variables and find qualitatively similar results. 














probability of default and accounting-based Altman Z score) (see Internet Appendix IA1 for 
details). Second, we document that even after controlling additional and alternative variables 
(e.g., substantial shareholders and board size), the inverse relation between CGQ and default 
risk survives (see Internet Appendix IA2 for details). Finally, we show that the significant 
inverse impact of corporate governance on default risk exists only for the financial 
unconstrained firms (see Internet Appendix IA3 for details). 
  
9. Conclusion 
We contribute to the ongoing debate in literature: Does corporate governance quality 
affect default risk? It is timely and imperative to investigate the relationship between CGQ 
and default risk in the Australian context for three reasons. First, CGQ is the prime reason 
behind a series of defaults that occurred in Australia. Second, the Australian context—High 
agency costs, high ownership concentration, weak market for control and low litigation 
risk—is unique, so findings from other countries may not directly apply to Australia. Third, 
the scant Australian literature provides inconclusive evidence on the relationship between 
CGQ and default risk, when the endogeneity bias is considered.  
Compared to Schultz et al. (2015), who use the sample of large Australian firms over the 
short period of 2001 to 2007, we provide additional evidence on the governance-default 
linkage by investigating such a relationship using firms from the different size groups (small, 
medium and large) over the long period from 2001 to 2013. Moreover, compared to the 
individual governance mechanisms used by Schultz et al. (2015), we employ a composite 
internal governance score based on the Horwath report. Furthermore, unlike Schultz et al. 
(2015), who employ only a market-based (DD and PD) proxy, we employ both market-based 
(DD, CDS and PD) and accounting-based (ALTMAN) proxies for default risk. Finally, we 
address endogeneity bias by using lagged independent variables, an instrumental variable 
approach, and dynamic panel data estimation techniques.  
Our study, based on such methodological improvements, provides contrasting evidence, 
compared to that of Schultz et al. (2015). In particular, we show that the corporate 
governance quality of a firm is significantly relevant (negative) to its default risk in Australia. 
The findings are robust to an endogeneity bias, as well as to different estimation methods, to 
alternative proxies for default risk, and to alternative control variables. From a wider 
regulatory perspective, these index-based findings are supportive of the development of a 
comprehensive code of governance practice, as opposed to the adoption of individual 
governance practices. Additionally, these findings provide guidelines for investors to use 
composite governance as a benchmark in the selection of stocks that are less likely to face 
default. 
We make two further major contributions to the existing literature. First we provide an 
insight into whether the effect of CGQ on default risk is homogeneous across degrees of 














mostly for firms with more growth opportunities. These results suggest that improvement in 
corporate governance is more effective in reducing default risk for the firms with high growth 
opportunities. Second, in a similar fashion, our study is the first to show that CGQ reduces 
default risk through the channel of information asymmetry, as captured by various 
dimensions of stock liquidity. Specifically, we find the interaction effect of CGQ and stock 
liquidity on default risk is stronger than the stand-alone partial effect of CGQ on default risk. 
These results imply that firms with poor stock liquidity should attempt to have high standards 
of corporate governance so that they can prevent future default conditions. 
Overall, these findings suggest that CGQ is an important determinant of default risk, 
particularly for firms with high growth opportunities and greater stock liquidity. These 
findings have further implication for investors and firms. Investors require a risk premium for 
holding a stock of firms with low growth, poor stock liquidity and high default risk. Since we 
show that firms with better governance, high growth, and greater stock liquidity have a lower 
level of default risk, investors in these firms do not receive a risk premium; thus, the cost of 
equity for such firms is lower, which in turn is beneficial for improving firm value. Given 
these practical implications, investors and firms may wish to monitor the governance quality 
more closely so as to devise sound investment and corporate strategies, respectively.  
The possible extensions to our study include but are not limited to: (1) the investigation 
of governance–default linkage using similar methodology in multi-countries accounting for 
institutional differences, (2) the in-depth investigation of the effect of GFC on the 
relationship between CGQ and default risk, (3) the exploration of governance mechanisms 
other than board structure such as boardroom gender diversity and managerial compensation 
that may affect the governance–default linkage, (4) the employment of the governance 
quality index in default prediction models as a key input to predict actual default events in 
Australia, and (5) the potential extension of this research to financial firms.  
References 
Adams, R. B., Ferreira, D., 2007. A theory of friendly boards. The journal of finance.  62, (1), 
217-250.  
Aitken, M., Frino, A., 1996. The determinants of market bid ask spreads on the australian 
stock exchange: Cross‐ ectional analysis. Accounting & Finance.  36, (1) 51-63.  
Ali, S., Liu, B., Su, J. J., 2016. What determines stock liquidity in Australia? Applied 
Economics.  48, (35), 3329-3344.  
Amihud, Y., 2002. Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects. Journal 
of Financial Markets.  5, (1), 31-56.  
Arellano, M., Bover, O., 1995. Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-
components models. Journal of econometrics.  68, (1), 29-51.  















Ashbaugh-Skaifea, H., Collinsb, D. W., LaFondc, R., 2006. The effects of corporate 
governance on firms’ credit ratings. Journal of Accounting and Economics.  42, (1), 
203-243.  
Balcaen, S., Ooghe, H., 2006. 35 years of studies on business failure: An overview of the 
classic statistical methodologies and their related problems. The British Accounting 
Review.  38, (1), 63-93.  
Beaver, W. H., 1966. Financial ratios as predictors of failure. Journal of Accounting 
Research.  4,, 71-111.  
Beekes, W., Brown, P., Zhang, Q., 2015. Corporate governance and the informativeness of 
disclosures in Australia: a re‐examination. Accounting & Finance.  55, (4), 931-963.  
Black, B. S., Kim, W., Jang, H., Park, K.-S., 2015. How corporate governance affect firm 
value? Evidence on a self-dealing channel from a natural experiment in Korea. 
Journal of Banking & Finance.  51,, 131-150.  
Black, F., 1971. Toward a fully automated stock exchange, part I. Financial Analysts Journal.  
27, (4), 28-35.  
Black, F., Scholes, M., 1973. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. The journal of 
political economy.  81, (3), 637-654.  
Blundell, R., Bond, S., 1998. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data 
models. Journal of econometrics.  87, (1), 115-143.  
Brogaard, J., Li, D., Xia, Y., 2015. The Effect of Stock Liquidity on Default Risk. Journal of 
Financial Economics, Forthcoming.  
Chai, D., Faff, R., Gharghori, P., 2010. New evidence on the relation between stock liquidity 
and measures of trading activity. International Review of Financial Analysis.  19, (3), 
181-192.  
Chang, M., D'Anna, G., Watson, I., Wee, M., 2008. Does disclosure quality via investor 
relations affect information asymmetry? Australian Journal of Management.  33, (2), 
375-390.  
Chen, T., 2015. Institutions, board structure, and corporate performance: Evidence from 
Chinese firms. Journal of Corporate Finance.  32,, 217-237.  
Chen, T., Harford, J., Lin, C., 2015. Do analysts matter for governance? Evidence from 
natural experiments. Journal of financial Economics.  115, (2), 383-410.  
Chiang, S. M., Chung, H., Huang, C. M., 2015. A note on board characteristics, ownership 
structure and default risk in Taiwan. Accounting & Finance.  55, (1), 57-74.  
Chung, K. H., Elder, J., Kim, J.-C., 2010. Corporate Governance and Liquidity. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis.  45, (2), 265-291.  
Clarke, F., Dean, G. W. 2007.  Indecent disclosure: Gilding the corporate lily, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., Naveen, L., 2008. Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of 
financial economics.  87, (2), 329-356.  
Collett, P., Hrasky, S., 2005. Voluntary disclosure of corporate governance practices by listed 















Daily, C. M., Dalton, D. R., 1994. Bankruptcy and corporate governance: The impact of 
board composition and structure. Academy of Management Journal.  37, (6), 1603-
1617.  
Duan, J.-C., Van Laere, E., 2012. A public good approach to credit ratings–From concept to 
reality. Journal of Banking & Finance.  36, (12), 3239-3247.  
Durbin, J., 1954. Errors in variables. Review of the International Statistical.  22, (1/3), 23-32.  
Elloumi, F., Gueyie, J.-P., 2001. Financial distress and corporate governance: an empirical 
analysis. Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society.  1, 
(1), 15-23.  
Fama, E. F., Jensen, M. C., 1983. Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of Law & 
Economics.  26, (2), 301-325.  
Fazzari, S. M., Hubbard, R. G., Petersen, B. C., Blinder, A. S., Poterba, J. M., 1988. 
Financing constraints and corporate investment. Brookings papers on economic 
activity.  1988, (1), 141-206.  
Fisman, R., Svensson, J., 2007. Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm 
level evidence. Journal of Development Economics.  83, (1), 63-75.  
Frino, A., Jones, S., Wong, J. B., 2007. Market behaviour around bankruptcy announcements: 
Evidence from the Australian Stock Exchange. Accounting & Finance.  47, (4), 713-
730.  
Gaver, J. J., Gaver, K. M., 1993. Additional evidence on the association between the 
investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation 
policies. Journal of Accounting and Economics.  16, (1), 125-160.  
Gertler, M., Gilchrist, S., 1994. Monetary policy, business cycles, and the behavior of small 
manufacturing firms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics.  109, (2), 309-340.  
Gharghori, P., Chan, H., Faff, R., 2006. Investigating the performance of alternative default-
risk models: Option-based versus accounting-based approaches. Australian Journal of 
Management.  31, (2), 207-234.  
Gippel, J., Smith, T., Zhu, Y., 2015. Endogeneity in Accounting and Finance Research: 
Natural Experiments as a State‐of‐the‐Art Solution. Abacus.  51, (2), 143-168.  
Glosten, L. R., Milgrom, P. R., 1985. Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market 
with heterogeneously informed traders. Journal of financial economics.  14, (1), 71-
100.  
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., Metrick, A., 2003. Corporate governance and equity prices. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics.  118, (1), 107-156.  
Goyenko, R. Y., Holden, C. W., Trzcinka, C. A., 2009. Do liquidity measures measure 
liquidity? Journal of financial economics.  92, (2), 153-181.  
Graham, J. R., Lemmon, M. L., Schallheim, J. S., 1998. Debt, leases, taxes, and the 
endogeneity of corporate tax status. The journal of finance.  53, (1), 131-162.  
Harrison, J. R., 1987. The strategic use of corporate board committees. California 














Haß, L. H., Vergauwe, S., Zhang, Q., 2014. Corporate governance and the information 
environment: Evidence from Chinese stock markets. International Review of 
Financial Analysis.  36, 106-119.  
Hausman, J. A., 1978. Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society.  46, (6), 1251-1271.  
Henry, D., 2008. Corporate governance structure and the valuation of australian firms: Is 
there value in ticking the boxes? Journal of Business Finance & Accounting.  35, (7‐
8), 912-942.  
Henry, D., 2010. Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance compliance: A 
private contracting perspective. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal.  18, (1), 24-46.  
Hermalin, B. E., Weisbach, M. S., 1988. The determinants of board composition. The RAND 
Journal of Economics.  19, (4), 589-606.  
Hillegeist, S. A., Keating, E. K., Cram, D. P., Lundstedt, K. G., 2004. Assessing the 
probability of bankruptcy. Review of Accounting Studies.  9, (1), 5-34.  
Huang, R. D., Stoll, H. R., 1996. Dealer versus auction markets: A paired comparison of 
execution costs on nasdaq and the nyse. Journal of financial Economics.  41, (3), 3 3-
357.  
Hull, J. 2009.  Options, futures and other derivatives, Pearson education. 
Hutchinson, M., Gul, F. A., 2004. Investment opportunity set, corporate governance practices 
and firm performance. Journal of Corporate Finance.  10, (4), 595-614.  
James-Overheu, C., Cotter, J., 2009. Corporate Governance and Sustainability Disclosures 
and the Assessment of Default Risk. Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting.  1, (1).  
Jensen, M. C., Meckling, W. H., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs 
and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics.  3, (4), 305-360.  
Jiraporn, P., Kim, J. C., Kim, Y. S., 2011. Dividend payouts and corporate governance 
quality: An empirical investigation. Financial Review.  46, (2), 251-279.  
Kang, H., Cheng, M., Gray, S. J., 2007. Corporate governance and board composition: 
Diversity and independence of Australian boards. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review.  15, (2), 194-207.  
Karpoff, J. M., Wittry, M. D., 2015. Institutional and political economy considerations in 
natural experiments: The case of state antitakeover laws.  Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2493913 
Klein, A., 2002. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings 
management. Journal of Accounting and Economics.  33, (3), 375-400.  
Kyle, A. S., 1985. Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society.  53, (6), 1315-1335.  
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1998. Law and finance. Journal 
of Political Economy.  106, (6), 1113–1155.  
Lasfer, M. A., 2002. Board structure and agency costs. Paper presented at the European 
Financial Management Association, London.  
Leiper, N., 2002. Why Ansett Airlines failed and how to prevent it happening again. Current 














Linck, J. S., Netter, J. M., Yang, T., 2008. The determinants of board structure. Journal of 
financial Economics.  87, (2), 308-328.  
Lipson, M. L., Mortal, S., 2009. Liquidity and capital structure. Journal of Financial Markets.  
12, (4), 611-644.  
Liu, W., 2006. A liquidity-augmented capital asset pricing model. Journal of financial 
Economics.  82, (3), 631-671.  
Liu, Y., Mauer, D. C., 2011. Corporate cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives. 
Journal of financial Economics.  102, (1), 183-198.  
Liu, Y., Miletkov, M. K., Wei, Z., Yang, T., 2015. Board independence and firm performance 
in China. Journal of Corporate Finance.  30, (1) 223-244.  
Liu, Y., Wei, Z., Xie, F., 2014. Do women directors improve firm performance in china? 
Journal of Corporate Finance.  28, (1), 169-184.  
Lyandres, E., Zhdanov, A., 2013. Investment opportunities and bankruptcy prediction. 
Journal of Financial Markets.  16, (3), 439-476.  
Méndez, C. F., Pathan, S., García, R. A., 2015. Monitoring capabilities of busy and overlap 
directors: Evidence from Australia. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal.  35,, 444-469.  
Merton, R. C., 1974. On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates*. 
The journal of finance.  29, (2), 449-470.  
Miglani, S., Ahmed, K., Henry, D., 2010. Corporate governance and financial distress: 
Evidence from australia. Paper presented at the AFAANZ conference, Christchurch, 
New Zealand.  
Miglani, S., Ahmed, K., Henry, D., 2015. Voluntary corporate governance structure and 
financial distress: Evidence from Australia. Journal of Contemporary Accounting & 
Economics.  11, (1), 18-30.  
Monem, R., 2011. The OneTel collapse: Lessons for corporate governance. Australian 
Accounting Review.  21, (4), 340-351.  
Monem, R. M., 2013. Determinants of board structure: Evidence from Australia. Journal of 
Contemporary Accounting & Economics.  9, (1), 33-49.  
Myers, S. C., 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of financial Economics.  5, 
(2), 147-175.  
Owen, N. (2003). Report of the HIH Royal Commission. Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra. 
Pathan, S., 2009. Strong boards, ceo power and bank risk-taking. Journal of Banking & 
Finance.  33, (7), 1340-1350.  
Petersen, M. ., 2009. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing 
approaches. Review of financial studies.  22, (1), 435-480.  
Platt, H., Platt, M., 2012. Corporate board attributes and bankruptcy. Journal of Business 
Research.  65, (8), 1139-1143.  
Prommin, P., Jumreornvong, S., Jiraporn, P., 2014. The effect of corporate governance on 
stock liquidity: The case of Thailand. International Review of Economics & Finance.  














Roodman, D., 2009. A note on the theme of too many instruments. Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and statistics.  71, (1), 135-158.  
Rutherford, M. A., Buchholtz, A. K., 2007. Investigating the relationship between board 
characteristics and board information. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review.  15, (4), 576-584.  
Schultz, E. L., Tan, D. T., Walsh, K. D., 2015. Corporate governance and the probability of 
default. Accounting & Finance.  
Smith, C. W., Watts, R. L., 1992. The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, 
dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of financial Economics.  32, (3), 263-
292.  
Staiger, D., Stock, J., 1997. Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments. 
Econometrica.  65, (3), 557-586.  
Stock, J. H., Yogo, M., 2005. Testing for weak instruments in linear IV regression. 
Identification and inference for econometric models: Essays in honor of Thomas 
Rothenberg (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).  
Switzer, L. N., Wang, J., 2013. Default risk estimation, bank credit risk, and corporate 
governance. Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments.  22, (2), 91-112.  
Tang, D. Y., Yan, H., 2010. Market conditions, default risk and credit spreads. Journal of 
Banking & Finance.  34, (4), 743-753.  
Upadhyay, A. D., Bhargava, R., Faircloth, S. D., 2014. Board structure and role of 
monitoring committees. Journal of Business Research.  67, (7), 1486-1492.  
Weisbach, M. S., 1988. Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of financial Economics.  
20,, 431-460.  
Windmeijer, F., 2005. A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step 
gmm estimators. Journal of econometrics.  126, (1), 25-51.  
Wooldridge, J. M. 2006.  Introductory econometrics: A modern approach,  3 ed, Thomson 
SouthWestern, Ohio. 
Wu, D. M., 1973. Alternative tests of independence between stochastic regressors and 
disturbances. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society.  41, (4), 733-750.  
Yang, T., Zhao, S., 2014. CEO duality and firm performance: Evidence from an exogenous 
shock to the competitive environment. Journal of Banking & Finance.  49,, 534-552.  
Zahra, S. A., Pearce, J. A., 1989. Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A 


















Table 1: Variables definitions 
Notation Variable name Measures 
Panel A: Default risk (DEFAULT) 
DD Distance to default Obtained from Risk Management Institute at NUS 
CDS Credit default swap spread  Obtained from Risk Management Institute at NUS 
PD Probability of default Obtained from Risk Management Institute at NUS 
Panel B: Corporate governance quality (CGQ) 
CG index Corporate governance index  CG index is a self-constructed index based on 17 objective 
criteria of the Horwath report, which ranges from 0 to 17 
each year. 
Board Board quality index Board quality is a self-constructed board quality index 
based on respective criteria, which ranges from 0 to 3. 
Audit Audit quality index Audit quality is a self-constructed audit quality index based 
on respective criteria, which ranges from 0 to 6. 
Nomination Nomination quality index Nomination quality is a self-constructed governance 
category based on respective criteria, which ranges from 0 
to 4. 
Remuneration Remuneration quality index Remuneration quality is a self-constructed governance 
category based on respective criteria, which ranges from 0 
to 4. 
Panel C: Growth opportunities 
MTB Growth opportunities Market value divided by book value of equity. 
Panel D: Measures of stock liquidity (SLIQ) 
TWQS Time-weighted quoted spread Daily ratio of time-weighted bid-ask spread divided by 
time-weighted mid-point spread averaged over a number of 
trading days in the financial year. 
AMIHUD Amihud illiquidity estimate Daily ratio of absolute stock return to trading volume in 
Australian dollars averaged over a number of trading days 
in the financial year. 
LM Turnover-adjusted zero daily 
volumes 
Turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes 
Panel E: Measures of control variables 
ROA Profitability Net income divided by total assets. 
TLTA Leverage Total liabilities divided by total assets. 
LIQUID Liquidity Current assets divided by current liabilities. 
Ln(AGE) Firm age Natural logarithm of the number of year firm has been 
listed on the ASX at the end of its financial year. 
Ln(TA) Firm size Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets at the 
end of the financial year. 
YR Year effect  Thirteen separate dummy variables which equal either ‘1’ 
or ‘0’ for each year from 2001 to 2013, with 2001 being the 
excluded year. 
IND Industry effect  Nine separate dummy variables which equal either ‘1’ or 
‘0’ for each industry (consumer staples, health care, 
information technology, industrials, materials, consumer 
discretionary, energy, utility, and telecommunication 
services), with telecommunication services being the 
excluded industry. The industry classification is based on 
Standard & Poor’s two-digit Global Industry Classification 
Scheme (GICS). 





The average CGQ of all the firms in firm i’s industry 















Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Whole sample Pre reform  Post reform  Post GFC 
 2001 to 2013 2001 to 2003 2004 to 2007 2010 to 2013 
Variables Obs. Mean std. Q1 Median Q3 Obs. Mean Std. Obs. Mean Std. Obs. Mean Std. 
DD 8851 3.52 2.50 1.71 3.07 4.81 1938 3.06 2.26 2898 4.09 2.64 2579 3.71 2.63 
CDS 8797 1.91 1.62 0.81 2.04 3.15 1921 2.19 1.57 2878 1.66 1.62 2566 1.67 1.64 
CG index 8851 8.53 4.58 5.00 9.00 12.00 1938 6.59 3.73 2898 8.44 4.52 2579 9.96 4.73 
Board quality 8851 2.10 0.68 2.00 2.00 3.00 1938 1.87 0.54 2898 2.08 0.69 2579 2.25 0.72 
Audit quality 8851 3.49 1.95 3.00 4.00 5.00 1938 2.95 1.86 2898 3.49 1.95 2579 3.88 1.93 
Nomination quality 8851 1.09 1.51 0.00 0.00 3.00 1938 0.45 1.06 2898 1.05 1.48 2579 1.57 1.64 
Remuneration 
quality 8851 1.85 1.54 0.00 2.00 3.00 1938 1.33 1.42 2898 1.82 1.52 2579 2.26 1.53 
ROA (%) 8851 -0.15 0.56 -0.18 0.00 0.10 1938 -0.17 0.55 2898 -0.13 0.51 2579 -0.13 0.56 
TLTA (%) 8851 0.38 0.38 0.13 0.35 0.54 1938 0.40 0.33 2898 0.39 0.38 2579 0.35 0.38 
LIQUID 8851 5.39 10.58 1.13 1.83 4.46 1938 4.57 10.24 2898 5.33 10.63 2579 5.69 10.63 
AGE (in years) 8851 14.68 12.70 5.89 11.62 19.56 1938 12.67 12.14 2898 14.04 12.46 2579 17.04 13.10 
Ln(AGE) 8851 2.33 0.90 1.77 2.45 2.97 1938 2.13 0.95 2898 2.27 0.92 2579 2.56 0.77 
Ln(TA) 8851 18.04 2.17 16.55 17.89 19.41 1938 17.59 2.16 2898 17.89 2.16 2579 18.54 2.15 
MTB 8851 2.51 2.32 0.92 1.69 3.20 1938 2.24 2.19 2898 3.03 2.43 2579 2.17 2.18 














Table 3 Year-wise and sector-wise governance quality 
Panel A: Year wise averages of overall index and sub-indices 
 CG Index Board Audit Nomination Remuneration 
2001 6.26 1.80 2.85 0.33 1.29 
2002 6.33 1.85 2.85 0.36 1.27 
2003 7.19 1.95 3.14 0.66 1.44 
2004 8.04 2.04 3.37 0.93 1.71 
2005 8.37 2.09 3.49 1.01 1.79 
2006 8.61 2.10 3.53 1.12 1.86 
2007 8.70 2.11 3.56 1.14 1.90 
2008 8.61 2.14 3.52 1.13 1.83 
2009 9.08 2.19 3.62 1.30 1.97 
2010 9.48 2.20 3.72 1.44 2.11 
2011 9.84 2.25 3.84 1.56 2.19 
2012 10.31 2.28 3.95 1.69 2.40 
2013 10.31 2.27 4.03 1.63 2.38 
Panel B: Industry-wise averages of overall index and sub-indices 
 CG Index Board Audit Nomination Remuneration 
CD 9.89 2.20 4.12 1.37 2.21 
CS 10.90 2.30 4.58 1.77 2.25 
E 7.33 2.06 2.92 0.84 1.50 
HC 9.26 2.25 3.83 1.15 2.03 
I 10.31 2.23 4.31 1.41 2.36 
IT 8.83 2.06 3.73 1.04 2.01 
M 6.88 1.94 2.73 0.78 1.43 
TS 9.79 2.14 3.89 1.59 2.16 
















Table 4: CGQ and default risk (H1): Main results 
Distance to default (DD)   Credit default spread (CDS) 
OLS  FE   OLS  FE 
(1)  (2)   (3)  (4) 
Corporate governance quality 
CG index 0.021**  0.036***   -0.021***  -0.021*** 
(2.10)  (3.44)   (-3.21)  (-2.94) 
Firm characteristics 
ROA 0.195**  0.139**   -0.124**  -0.158*** 
(2.28)  (2.42)   (-2.29)  (-3.46) 
TLTA -1.221***  -0.736***   1.041***  0.623*** 
(-6.21)  (-5.96)   (7.46)  (6.79) 
LIQUID 0.032***  0.019***   -0.035***  -0.023*** 
(10.35)  (5.42)   (-14.19)  (-8.56) 
Ln(AGE) -0.024  -0.575***   0.070**  0.450*** 
(-0.54)  (-5.77)   (2.48)  (6.88) 
Ln(TA) 0.466***  0.188***   -0.217***  -0.020 
(15.74)  (5.32)   (-11.95)  (-0.81) 
MTB 0.364***  0.231***   -0.231***  -0.153*** 
(17.39)  (14.33)   (-19.15)  (-15.03) 
Industry effect (IND) Yes  No   Yes  No 
Year effect (YR) Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes 
Firm effect No  Yes   No  Yes 
Constant -4.520***  0.182   6.064***  2.182*** 
(-3.50)  (0.28)   (9.71)  (4.89) 
Adj. R2 0.361  0.216   0.359  0.216 
Observations 8851  8851   8797  8797 
This table presents the regression results (using OLS and FE methods) between corporate governance quality and default risk. See Table 1 
for variable definitions. Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Standard errors are corrected based on one-way clustering by firm (e.g., 
















Table 5: CGQ and default risk (H1): Individual governance categories 
Distance to default (DD)  Credit default spread (CDS) 
FE FE FE FE  FE FE FE FE 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Governance categories 
Board  0.095**  -0.057* 
(2.03)  (-1.89) 
Audit 0.045**  -0.023 
(2.16)  (-1.49) 
Nomination 0.068***  -0.037** 
(2.80)  (-2.23) 
Remuneration 0.064***  -0.044*** 
(2.70)  (-2.71) 
Firm characteristics 
ROA 0.123** 0.129** 0.127** 0.128**  -0.148*** -0.151*** -0.150*** -0.152*** 
(2.14) (2.24) (2.20) (2.23)  (-3.23) (-3.29) (-3.27) (-3.32) 
LEV -0.727*** -0.734*** -0.730*** -0.735***  0.619*** 0.622*** 0.620*** 0.623*** 
(-5.84) (-5.94) (-5.89) (-5.93)  (6.70) (6.77) (6.75) (6.79) 
LIQUID 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.019***  -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
(5.38) (5.39) (5.37) (5.41)  (-8.52) (-8.52) (-8.52) (-8.55) 
Ln(AGE) -0.573*** -0.571*** -0.579*** -0.571***  0.449*** 0.448*** 0.452*** 0.447*** 
(-5.74) (-5.72) (-5.80) (-5.73)  (6.87) (6.84) (6.90) (6.83) 
Ln(TA) 0.224*** 0.206*** 0.214*** 0.206***  -0.041* -0.033 -0.036 -0.028 
(6.62) (5.91) (6.29) (5.91)  (-1.68) (-1.31) (-1.46) (-1.13) 
MTB 0.232*** 0.231*** 0.232*** 0.231***  -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.154*** 
(14.41) (14.34) (14.38) (14.35)  (-15.15) (-15.05) (-15.09) (-15.04) 
Industry effect (IND) No No No No  No No No No 
Year effect (YR) Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.396 -0.047 -0.066 0.007  2.528*** 2.341*** 2.342*** 2.254*** 
(-0.63) (-0.07) (-0.10) (0.01)  (5.67) (5.25) (5.26) (5.03) 
Adj. R2 0.215 0.215 0.215 0.215  0.215 0.215 0.215 0.216 
Observations 8851 8851 8851 8851  8797 8797 8797 8797 
This table presents the regression results (using FE method) between corporate governance categories and default risk. See Table 1 for variable definitions. Figures in parenthesis are the -statistics. Standard errors are 














Table 6: CGQ and default risk (H1): Lagged independent variables 
  Distance to default (DD)   Credit default spread (CDS) 
Lagged OLS   Lagged FE 
 
Lagged OLS   Lagged FE 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Corporate governance quality 





























































































Observations 7697    7697    7654   7654 
This table presents the regression results (using lag ed independent variables) between corporate governance quality and default risk. See 
Table 1 for variable definitions. Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Standard errors are corrected based on one-way clustering by firm 


















Table 7: CGQ and default risk (H1): Instrumental variable approach and dynamic panel data estimation 
  Panel A: Instrumental variable approach   Panel B: Dynamic panel data estimation techniques 
 First-stage Second-stage 
 
Dynamic OLS   Dynamic FE   Dynamic GMM   Dynamic OLS   Dynamic FE   Dynamic GMM 
 CGQ DD CDS 
 
DD   DD   DD 
 
CDS   CDS   CDS 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9) 
Corporate governance quality 
Industry-average CGQ 0.564*** 
              
 
(21.18) 
              



















































































































































































































































































               
F-test (instrument) 448.71*** 
              
Partial R2 0.09  
              
Hansen J-statistics 
 











         
[0.219] 
     
[0.263] 


























         
[0.000] 
     
[0.000] 













         
[0.946] 
     
[0.877] 














This table presents the regression results between corporate governance quality and default risk using 2SLS in Panel A and using dynamic panel data estimation methods Panel B. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
We use robust standard errors, incorporating the Windmeijer (2005) small-sample correction. Instruments are collapsed to reduce IV proliferation and preserve sample depth. Finally, Arellano–Bond AR(1) and AR(2) 
are the test statistics for first-order and second-rder serial correlation, respectively. Hansen J-statistics is the test of over-identifying restrictions. Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Standard errors are corrected 














Table 8a: Univariate analysis between CGQ and default risk at varying degrees of 
growth (H2) 
Growth quantiles Correlation between CGQ and DD Correlation between CGQ and CDS 
Q1 (Lowest) 0.092 -0.026 
Q2 0.207 -0.126 
Q3 0.276 -0.163 
Q4 0.292 -0.219 
Q5 (Highest) 0.325 -0.277 
 
Table 8b: Joint effect of CGQ and growth opportunities on default risk (H2) 
  Distance to default (DD)   Credit default spread (CDS) 
OLS   FE 
 
OLS   FE 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Panel A: Partial effect when MTB=0 
Corporate governance quality 


































































































































































Panel B: Partial effect when MTB>0 































































  (6.41)   (7.04)   (-7.83)   (-6.91) 
This table presents the regression results (using OLS and FE methods) on the interaction effect of corporate governance quality and growth 
opportunities on default risk in Panel A, and partial effect of corporate governance quality on default risk at different level of growth 
opportunities in Panel B. See Table 1 for variable definitions. Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Standard errors are corrected based 
















Table 9: Joint effect of CGQ and stock liquidity on default risk (H3) 
 
Distance to default (DD) Credit default spread (CDS) 
 
FE   FE  FE  FE   FE  FE 
 
(1)   (2)  (3)  (4)   (5)  (6) 
Corporate governance quality 
CG index 0.012   0.015  0.020*  -0.008   -0.010  -0.014** 
 
(1.03)   (1.31)  (1.70)  (-1.16)   (-1.54)  (-2.16) 

















CG index*TWQS 0.043***       -0.025***      
 














  -0.255***  
 
  




  (-3.66)  
 
CG index*Amihud    0.041***       -0.023***   
  

































ROA 0.200***   0.191***  0.193***  -0.193***   -0.186***  -0.183*** 
 
(3.54)   (3.38)  (3.31)  (-5.72)   (-5.51)  (-5.35) 
LEV -0.774***   -0.749***  -0.736***  0.643***   0.625***  0.618*** 
 
(-6.70)   (-6.36)  (-6.21)  (13.89)   (13.45)  (13.2 ) 
LIQUID 0.018***   0.018***  0.018***  -0.023***   -0.023***  -0.023*** 
 
(5.23)   (5.14)  (5.22)  (-16.12)   (-15.97)  (-16.08) 
Ln(AGE) -0.577***   -0.587***  -0.583***  0.450***   0.455***  0.453*** 
 
(-5.85)   (-5.89)  (-5.82)  (10.13)   (10.19)  (10.09) 
Ln(TA) 0.005   0.052  0.083**  0.095***   0.063***  0.037* 
 
(0.13)   (1.42)  (2.22)  (4.88)   (3.28)  (1.88) 
MTB 0.206***   0.214***  0.224***  -0.137***   -0.142***  -0.149*** 
 
(13.16)   (13.50)  (14.00)  (-19.60)   (-20.25)  (-21.35) 
Year effect (YR) Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes 
Firm effect Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes 
Constant 3.269***   2.532***  1.955***  0.260   0.766**  1.240*** 
 
(5.03)   (3.95)  (2.92)  (0.77)   (2.28)  (3.66) 
Adj. R2 0.244   0.235  0.228  0.135   0.126  0.116 
Observations 8851   8851  8851  8797   8797  8797 
This table presents the regression results (using FE method) on the interaction effect of corporate governance quality and stock liquidity on 
default risk. See Table 3.1 for variable definitions. Figures in parenthesis are the -statistics. Standard errors are corrected based on one-way 















Table 10: Joint effect of CGQ and stock liquidity on default risk: Split sample analysis 
Distance to default  Credit default spread (CDS) 
TWQS Amihud LM  TWQS Amihud LM 
Low High Low High Low High  Low High Low High Low High 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Corporate governance quality 
CG index -0.001 0.056*** 0.001 0.055*** 0.007 0.052***  0.000 -0.027*** -0.003 -0.024** -0.003 -0.025**  
(-0.13) (3.48) (0.05) (3.25) (0.53) (3.29)  (0.00) (-2.82) (-0.34) (-2.34) (-0.34) (-2.60) 
Firm characteristics 
ROA 0.083* 0.630* 0.085* 0.424 0.108* 0.434**  -0.148*** -0.586** -0.149*** -0.380* -0.144*** -0.397*** 
 
(1.75) (1.69) (1.81) (1.38) (1.94) (2.41)  (-3.31) (-2.42) (-3.48) (-1.96) (-2.99) (-3.60) 
LEV -0.507*** -2.716*** -0.448*** -2.450*** -0.509*** -1.417***  0.469*** 1.742*** 0.432*** 1.604*** 0 .466*** 1.001*** 
 
(-5.86) (-4.08) (-5.02) (-4.27) (-5.07) (-2.97)  (6.57) (4.27) (5.73) (4.52) (5.75) (3.16) 
LIQUID 0.017*** -0.003 0.021*** -0.006 0.017*** 0.08  -0.023*** -0.005 -0.025*** -0.004 -0.023*** -0.013*** 
 
(4.66) (-0.40) (6.30) (-0.85) (4.19) (1.27)  (-8.58) (-0.95) (-8.96) (-0.81) (-8.02) (-2.96) 
Ln(AGE) -0.279** -0.681*** -0.363*** -0.731*** -0.295** -0.778***  0.392*** 0.405*** 0.386*** 0.454***  0.359*** 0.493*** 
 
(-2.35) (-4.39) (-3.21) (-4.57) (-2.40) (-4.80)  (4.40) (4.38) (4.34) (4.72) (3.86) (5.17) 
Ln(TA) 0.130*** 0.056 0.180*** 0.082 0.141*** 0.070  0.037 0.029 0.006 -0.001 0.011 0.023 
 
(3.49) (0.57) (4.88) (0.91) (3.28) (0.86)  (1.24) (0.47) (0.18) (-0.02) (0.34) (0.41) 
MTB 0.119*** 0.380*** 0.133*** 0.360*** 0.148*** 0. 332***  -0.097*** -0.231*** -0.103*** -0.220*** -0. 110*** -0.210*** 
(8.60) (12.12) (8.61) (12.18) (8.71) (12.30)  (-8.81) (-13.04) (-8.79) (-12.96) (-8.79) (-12.49) 
Year effect (YR) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.487 3.644** -0.274 3.128* 0.356 3.060**  1.508*** 0.713 2.081*** 1.237 1.953*** 1.045 
(0.76) (2.09) (-0.44) (1.93) (0.49) (2.05)  (2.89) (0.66) (3.91) (1.20) (3.44) (1.07) 
Adj. R2 0.172 0.260 0.203 0.251 0.179 0.256  0.175 0.282 0.179 0.274 0.173 0.274 
Observations 4556 4394 4555 4395 4560 4390  4505 4388 4511 4382 4507 4386 
This table presents the regression results (using FE method) of corporate governance quality and default risk for high vs low stock liquidity firms. The firms are classified into high liquid (low liquid) group if the 
TWQS, AMIHUD and LM are below (above) sample median. See Table 1 for variable definitions. Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Standard errors are corrected based on one-way clustering by firm (e.g., 
















Appendix A: General procedure to calculate distance to default (DD) 
The Merton (1974) model views the firm’s equity value as a European call option on the 
firm’s assets, with a strike price equal to the face value of the firm’s liabilities. This is 
because of the shareholders’ limited liability and their residual claim on the firm’s assets. If 
the firm’s value exceeds the level of liabilities (strike price) at the time of maturity, when the 
value of the equity is positive, shareholders exercis  their option and the firm survives. If the 
firm’s value falls below the level of liabilities (strike price) at the time of maturity, when the 
value of equity becomes zero, the model assumes shareholders do not exercise their option 
and the firm defaults. Thus, the larger the positive distance between firm value and firm 
liabilities, the lower is the probability of default risk. 
Value of firm (?) = value of equity (?") + Value of debt (X) 
Value of equity (?") = Value of firm (?) – Value of debt (X) 
Value of firm (?) > Value of debt (X)  Value of equity (?") is positive (firm survives) 
Value of firm (?) < Value of debt (X)  Value of equity (?") is zero (firm defaults)  
The Merton (1974) model has two important assumptions for the calculation of DD. 
First, it assumes that the value of the firm follows the geometric Brownian motion that is 
expressed as follows: 
3	? = 	m	?3T +	?3	        (A.1) 
where ? denotes the value of firm’s assets, m represents expected continuously compounded 
returns on the firm’s assets,  indicates instantaneous volatility of the firm’s assets, and 3 
is a standard Wiener process. 
Second, the model assumes that the firm has only two securities outstanding; namely, 
common stock and a zero coupon bond maturing at time (T).  
Based on these two assumptions, the equity of the firm can be viewed as a call option on 
the value of the firm’s assets, with a strike price equal to face value of the debt maturing at 
time T. Therefore, the market value of equity as a functio  of the total value of the firm’s 
assets can be expressed by using Black and Scholes’ (1973) formula for call options: 
?" = ?C3 − P	5HC	3Q       (A.2) 
where ?" is the market value of the firm’s equity, X is the face value of the debt, r is the risk-
free rate, T is the time horizon for the maturity of debt, N symbolizes the function of the 
cumulative standard normal distribution, and 3 and 3Q are given by the following formulas: 
3 =	 	M6	
* $H$	#%	*%									
*	√ ,      3Q =	3 −		√	              (A.3) 
In Eq. (A.2), ?", X, r, and T are readily observable and known factors, whereas ? and  














equation, so a unique solution to Eq. (A.2) is not available. Thus, another equation involving 
one of the two unknown factors is required.  
As in the Merton (1974) model, it is assumed that te value of the firm’s equity is a 
function of the value of its assets and time, so the second equation that relates the volatility of 
the firm’s equity to the volatility of the firm’s assets can be written as: 
" = ;*;
;
;* 	               (A.4) 
According to the Black-Scholes-Merton model, the term 
;
;* in Eq. (A.4) is equal to C3, and can be rewritten as follows: 
 " = ;*; 	C3               (A.5) 
Now, Eq. (A.2) and (A.5) can be solved simultaneously for the values of ? and , and 
DD can be calculated by using the following equation: 
  // = 	 	M6	
* $	#%	*%									
*	√                 (A.6) 
The probability of default (PD) is calculated as follows: 
)/ = C−//                   (A.7) 
In a nutshell, for the calculation of DD, the following steps are required:  
1) Estimating the volatility of the firm’s equity (") through historical stock price data or 
option-implied volatility data. Historical stock price data to estimate the volatility of the 
firm’s equity is easily available. Following the Hull (2009) methodology, equity volatility 
can be calculated as: 
> = Ln	V − V	        (A.8) 
where >  is the daily stock returns, Ln	is the natural logarithm, Vis the stock price at the 
end of the day and V is the stock price at the end of the previous day:2 =1, 2, 3…n.  






66 ∑ >6 Q      (A.9) 
where n denotes the number of observations in one year i.e., number of trading days. 
2) Selecting the forecasting horizon (T). Generally, the forecast horizon is one year (T=1).  
3) Measuring the face value of the debt (X). Generally, current liabilities plus half of the 
non-current liabilities are used to proxy the face value of debt, as also advised by 
Moody’s KMV.  
4) Collecting the risk-free rate (r). 3-month bank accepted bill or T-bills can be used to 
proxy risk-free rate.  
5) Measuring the market value of equity (?"). It is calculated as the number of outstanding 
shares multiplied by market price per share. 
6) Solving Eq. (A.2) and (A.5) simultaneously for the values of (?) and"), and then 














Appendix B: Horwath corporate governance report 2008 
1. Board of Directors 
1.1 The most desirable outcome will be for a company to have: 
1.1.1 A board with the majority of independent directors; 
1.1.2 An independent chairperson; and 
1.1.3 Met at least six times annually 
1.2 The least desirable outcome will be for a company to have: 
1.2.1 A board with no independent directors 
1.2.2 The CEO as chairperson; and 
1.2.3 Met less than six times annually. 
2. Audit Committee 
2.1 The most desirable outcome will be for a company to have an audit committee: 
2.1.1 With all the members, including the chair, independent; 
2.1.2 With a chair, who is not also the chair of the main board; 
2.1.3 With at least one member with professional or education l accounting qualifications; 
2.1.4 With at least three members; 
2.1.5 That does not comprise the full board; and 
2.1.6 That meets at least four times annually. 
2.2 The least desirable outcome will be for a company not to have an audit committee 
3. Remuneration Committee 
3.1 The most desirable outcome will be for a company to have a remuneration committee: 
3.1.1 With all the members, including the chair, independent; 
3.1.2 With at least three members; and 
3.1.3 That does not comprise the full board. 
3.2 The least desirable outcome will be for a company not to have a remuneration committee. 
4. Nomination Committee 
4.1 The most desirable outcome will be for a company to have a nomination committee: 
4.1.1 With all the members, including the chair, independent; 
4.1.2 With at least three members; and 
4.1.3 That does not comprise the full board 
4.2 The least desirable outcome will be for a company not to have a nomination committee. 
5. External Auditor Independence 
5.1 Weighting is placed on the proportion of non-audit fees (relative to audit fees) paid by a 
client to their auditor, and the policy relating to the provision of non-audit services. 
6. Code of Conduct and Other Policy Disclosures 
6.1 A weighting is included for the quality of disclosures relating to the existence and 
substance of a company’s: 
6.1.1 Code of Conduct; 
6.1.2 Policy on risk management; 
6.1.3 Policy on share trading; and 















Appendix C: Simplified CGQ index 
Number Governance categories Present Absent 
1 Board of Directors   
1.1 A board with the majority of independent directors 1 0 
1.2 An independent chairperson; and 1 0 
1.3 Met at least six times annually 1 0 
2 Audit Committee   
2.1 Existence of audit committee 1 0 
2.2 With all the members, including the chair, independent; 1 0 
2.3 With a chair, who is not also the chair of the main board; 1 0 
2.4 With at least three members; 1 0 
2.5 That does not comprise the full board; and 1 0 
2.6 That meets at least four times annually. 1 0 
3 Remuneration Committee   
3.1 Existence of remuneration committee 1 0 
3.2 With all the members, including the chair, independent; 1 0 
3.3 With at least three members; and 1 0 
3.4 That does not comprise the full board. 1 0 
4 Nomination Committee   
4.1 Existence of nomination committee 1 0 
4.2 With all the members, including the chair, independent; 1 0 
4.3 With at least three members; and 1 0 


















Internet Appendix IA1: Alternative default risk proxies 
In the main analysis, we employ two market-based proxies for default risk to test the 
hypothesis H1. However, in this section, we check the robustness of the main results by using 
alternative proxies for default risk. First, we employ an alternative market-based proxy for 
default risk that is probability of default (PD), which is derived from the Merton distance to 
default (DD) scores. In particular, we employ one, two, three and five year’s default 
probabilities. PD ranges from ‘0’ to ‘1’ where PD near to ‘0’ represents healthy firm and PD 
near to ‘1’ represents defaulted firm. This suggests that the higher the PD, the higher is the 
default risk. Second, we use accounting-based proxy for default risk. Past research has mostly 
relied on financial ratios as a proxy for default risk because they consider financial ratios as 
important indicators of financial status which could signal conditions of default. Thus, as a 
sensitivity analysis of the main results, we employ a modified Altman Z score (Graham et al., 
1998) as a proxy for default risk. We compute Altman as follows: 
oT4W = 1.2P + 1.4PQ + 3.3	Pa + 0.999	Pb																						IA. 1 
where Altman is the default risk; P is the working capital divided by total assets; PQ is the 
retained earnings divided by total assets; Pa is the earnings before interest and tax divided by 
total assets; Pb is the sales divided by total assets. Higher the Altman, lower is the degree of 
default risk. 
Table IA.1: CGQ and default risk (H1): Alternative proxies for default risk 
 
Probability of default 
 
Accounting-based default risk 
 








(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
Corporate governance quality 












(-2.13) (-1.28) (-0.73) (0.03) 
 
(20.92) (14.76) 




(9.03) (9.67) (10.11) (10.34) 
 
(-0.10) (-1.36) 




(-6.68) (-7.00) (-7.02) (-6.85) 
 
(-0.45) (0.72) 




(3.40) (4.68) (5.42) (6.22) 
 
(-6.35) (-4.98) 




(-1.05) (-0.46) (0.14) (0.81) 
 
(14.43) (15.53) 




(-12.10) (-10.29) (-8.70) (-6.32) 
 
(-7.66) (-9.55) 
Year effect (YR) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes No 
Industry effect (IND) No No No No 
 
Yes Yes 
Firm effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  No Yes 




(3.31) (2.75) (2.30) (1.97) 
 
(-12.03) (-14.41) 
Adj. R2 0.179 0.169 0.164 0.180 
 
0.667 0.506 
















This table presents the regression results on the effect of corporate governance quality on alternative proxies for default risk. See Table 1 for 
variable definitions. Figures in parenthesis are th t-statistics. Standard errors are corrected based on one-way clustering by firm (e.g., 
Petersen, 2009). Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectiv ly. 
We report the regression results for the main hypothesis (H1) based on alternative measure of 
default risk (PD and ALTMAN) in Table IA.1. Columns 1–4 is for PD and Columns 5–6 is for 
Altman in Panel B). The FE regression results confirm the pr sence of a strong negative 
effect of governance quality on PD across various default probability specifications (two, 
three, and five years); implying that corporate governance reduces default risk. Moreover, 
regression results show a statistically significant d positive regression coefficient on 
corporate governance for Altman across all regression model specifications (OLS and FE). 
Hence, the results using accounting-based proxy for default risk provide an additional support 
for H1. Overall, these results suggest that the main results are robust to the change in the 
default risk measurement. 
Internet Appendix IA2: Alternative control variables 
In this section, we use alternative and additional control variables in the regression model to 
address any misspecification error or omitted availble bias. First, we replace ‘net income 
over total asset’ with ‘earnings before interest and taxes over total assets’ as a measure of 
ROA. Second, we replace ‘current assets over current liabilities’ with ‘cash over current 
liabilities’ as a measure for LIQUID. Such specifications of ROA and LIQUID are more 
precise in measuring whether the firm has the ability to meet its debt obligations. Third, we 
include interest coverage ratio (ICR) which is measured as earnings before interest and axes 
divided by interest paid. ICR seems a more appropriate ratio to default risk because it has 
interest in the denominator, rather than in the general categories of total assets and liabilities. 
Fourth, prior literature suggest that the ownership concentration and board size may affect a 
firm’s default risk (Chiang et al., 2015). Hence, we include ownership concentration (Block) 
and board size (BSize) as an additional control variable. Block is measured as a percentage of 
outstanding shares held by substantial shareholders, and BSize is measured as a number of 
directors in the board (BSize). Finally, we include the average number of outside 
directorships held by the board (DIRECTORSHIPS) (Elloumi and Gueyie, 2001).  
Table IA.2 reports the regression results for the main hypothesis (H1), based on the 
alternative measure of control variables. The results show a statistically significant and 
positive (negative) regression coefficient on corporate governance for DD (CDS) across all 
regression model specifications (OLS, FE, and BE). Hence, the results using alternative 
control variables provide an additional support for H1.26  
  
                                                 
26Moreover, we check the robustness of the main results (H1) to alternative sample specifications such as 
excluding GFC observations (2008–2009), unbalanced data, and excluding largest 10 percent or the smallest 10 
















Table IA.2: CGQ and default risk (H1): Alternative proxies for control variables 
 
Distance to default (DD)  Credit default spread (CDS) 
 
OLS FE  OLS FE 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Corporate governance quality 
CG index 0.012* 0.038***  -0.008** -0.021*** 
 
(1.81) (3.60)  (-1.99) (-2.96) 
Firm characteristics 
ROA 0.225*** 0.141**  -0.190*** -0.163*** 
 
(4.37) (2.34)  (-5.70) (-3.49) 
LEV -1.381*** -0.768***  1.015*** 0.571*** 
 
(-20.28) (-5.88)  (22.71) (6.09) 
Ln(AGE) -0.047* -0.604***  0.063*** 0.442*** 
 
(-1.87) (-5.92)  (3.92) (6.74) 
Ln(TA) 0.466*** 0.237***  -0.264*** -0.093*** 
 
(25.97) (6.33)  (-22.86) (-3.59) 
MTB 0.349*** 0.223***  -0.192*** -0.136*** 
 
(34.93) (13.60)  (-30.01) (-13.26) 
BLOCK -0.003*** -0.004**  0.002*** 0.002** 
 
(-2.84) (-2.50)  (3.21) (2.02) 
BSize -0.059*** -0.069***  0.043*** 0.056*** 
 
(-4.38) (-3.80)  (4.96) (4.89) 
Directorships 0.027*** 0.002  -0.018*** -0.004 
 
(6.21) (0.38)  (-6.23) (-1.06) 
ICR 0.001 0.001**  -0.000 -0.001* 
 
(0.97) (1.99)  (-0.74) (-1.86) 
CASH 0.490*** 0.506***  -1.861*** -1.521*** 
 
(4.41) (3.39)  (-26.13) (-14.75) 
Year effect (YR) Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry effect (IND) Yes No  Yes No 
Firm effect No Yes  No Yes 
Constant -3.731*** -0.066  6.608*** 3.233*** 
 
(-8.08) (-0.10)  (22.38) (7.07) 
Adj. R2 0.353 0.215  0.370 0.231 
Observations 8875 8875  8820 8820 
This table presents the regression results on the effect of corporate governance quality and default risk using alternative control variables. 
ROA earnings before interest and taxes over total assets; CASH is cash over current liabilities; ICR is earnings before interest and taxes 
divided by interest paid; BLOCK is measured as a percentage of outstanding shares held by substantial shareholders; BSize is the number of 
directors in the board; Directorships is the averag number of outside directorships held by the board. See Table 1 for definitions of other 
variables. Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Standard errors are corrected based on one-way clustering by firm (e.g., Petersen, 2009). 
Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Internet Appendix IA3: Role of financial constraints 
Financial constrained firm is the one which has difficulty in accessing external finance due to 
extra cost and default occurs when the firm is unable to make interest and principal payment 
to the creditors. Considering this close linkage of financial constraints with default risk, we 
further explore does the effect of corporate governance on the default risk depend on whether 
a firm is financially constrained. In particular, this relation could be positive or at least non-
negative in financially constrained firms. To determine whether financial constraints 
influence the relation between corporate governance and the default risk, we interact 
corporate governance with variables that proxy for the degree to which a firm is financially 
constrained.  The coefficients on the constraint proxies interacted with CG index represent 
the partial effect of corporate governance on default risk for financially constrained firms 
whereas the coefficient on CG index denotes the partial effect of corporate governance on 














A number of financial constraint proxies are available in literature (Liu and Mauer, 2011). It 
is argued that small firms are more vulnerable to capital market imperfections (Gertler and 
Gilchrist, 1994). Based on this argument, firm size can be used as a measure of financial 
constraint. Similarly, dividend payout is an indicator of costly external finance because low 
payout firms have insufficient internal cash flow to fund investments and thus have to rely on 
external sources (Fazzari et al., 1988). 
Table IA.3 reports regression results in which we interact CG index with two different 
proxies of financial constraints: a dummy variable for whether a firm has low payouts 
(LowPayout) in Models 1–3 and a dummy variable for small firm size (SmallTA) in Models 
4–6. We use the sample medians of total assets and dividend payout ratio to construct the 
dummy variables SmallTA and LowPayout, respectively. LowPayout is a dummy variable 
which takes the value ‘1’ if the payouts is lower than the sample median, and ‘0’ otherwise; 
SmallTA is a dummy variable which takes the value ‘1’ if the firm size is lower than the 
sample median and ‘0’ otherwise. 
As can be seen in the table, the coefficients on the constraint proxies interacted with CG 
index are generally negative and statistically significant.  However, the coefficients on CG 
index are generally positive and statistically signif cant. These results suggest that the 
significant inverse impact of corporate governance on default risk exists only for the financial 
unconstrained firms, suggesting that large and dividend paying firms are benefited more from 
the improvement in corporate governance quality.”  
Table IA.3: The joint effect of CGQ and financial constraints on default risk (H1) 
Dividend Payout  Firm size 
OLS FE BE  OLS FE BE 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
CG index 0.047*** 0.072*** 0.047***  0.103*** 0.077*** 0.103*** 
(2.65) (4.23) (4.62)  (6.53) (7.36) (11.86) 
LowPayout  -1.198*** -0.532*** -1.198***     
(-5.55) (-2.70) (-9.30)     
CG index*LowPayout -0.047** -0.054*** -0.047***     
(-2.56) (-3.05) (-4.15)     
SmallTA     -0.061*** -0.024* -0.061*** 
     (-3.35) (-1.76) (-5.26) 
CG index*SmallTA     -0.617*** -0.140 -0.617*** 
     (-3.33) (-1.07) (-5.27) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes     
Industry effect (IND) Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm effect No Yes No  No Yes No 
Constant -1.252 0.986 -1.252***  3.421*** 3.341*** 3.421*** 
(-1.04) (1.55) (-3.00)  (3.02) (21.32) (9.68) 
Adj. R2 0.417 0.237 0.417  0.323 0.006 0.323 
Observations 8851 8851 8851  8851 8851 8851 
This table presents the regression results (using OLS, FE, and BE methods) on the interaction effect of corporate governance quality and 
financial constraints (LowPayout and SmallTA) on default risk. LowPayout is a dummy variable which takes the value ‘1’ if the payouts is 
lower than the sample median, and ‘0’ otherwise; SmallTA is a dummy variable which takes the value ‘1’ if the firm size is lower than the 
sample median, and ‘0’ otherwise; See Table 3.1 for variable definitions. Figures in parenthesis are th  t-statistics. Standard errors are 














• Our study contributes to the ongoing literature debate: Does corporate governance 
reduce default risk in Australia? 
• We show that the corporate governance is significantly and negatively associated with 
the default risk even after controlling for endogeneity bias. 
• We find that the inverse effect of corporate governance on default risk is stronger for 
high growth firms. 
• We also document that the corporate governance affects default risk through the 
channel of information asymmetry as measured by stock liquidity. 
 
